Detailed Assessment, 2026-07-31
The Court of Appeal held that SIAC has no jurisdiction to award costs in review cases unless and until the Lord Chancellor makes costs rules under section 5 of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997.
William Mackenzie, Costs Lawyer at Mackenzie Costs. More about William Mackenzie.
Last reviewed 5 November 2026.
Date: 31 July 2026
Judges: Sir Geoffrey Vos, Master of the Rolls, Lord Justice Bean and Lord Justice Singh
Court: Court of Appeal (Civil Division), on appeal from the Divisional Court (Dame Victoria Sharp PKBD and Mrs Justice Farbey), [2025] EWHC 2019 (Admin)
Citation: [2026] EWCA Civ 992
Nature of Proceedings: Appeal by two interested parties, H7 and H15, against a Divisional Court decision that quashed a costs order made by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) in favour of another SIAC applicant, FGF
Key Issues:
Appeal No: CA-2025-002134
Hearing date: 21 July 2026
Representation: Nick Armstrong KC and Emma Daykin (instructed by Deighton Peirce Glynn Solicitors) for H7 and H15; Lisa Giovannetti KC and Richard Evans (instructed by Government Legal Department) for the Home Secretary
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In R (Secretary of State for the Home Department) v Special Immigration Appeals Commission [2026] EWCA Civ 992 the Court of Appeal held that SIAC has no jurisdiction to award costs in review proceedings unless and until the Lord Chancellor makes costs rules under section 5 of the 1997 Act. He has not done so. The Home Secretary won. The appeal by H7 and H15 failed on construction, the human rights argument failed as well, and the Divisional Court's declarations stand. An applicant who wins a review in SIAC recovers no costs from the Home Secretary, and an applicant who loses pays none.
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SIAC reviews certain immigration and nationality decisions that the Home Secretary certifies as made in reliance on information that should not be made public. Those cases would otherwise go to the Administrative Court by judicial review. The Justice and Security Act 2013 added the review jurisdiction to the 1997 Act, which until then had dealt only with appeals ([20]).
FGF applied for naturalisation on 27 January 2020. On 16 February 2022 the Home Secretary refused the application on good character grounds and certified her decision under section 2D(1)(b). FGF could then challenge it only by a review in SIAC, and he applied on 23 February 2022 ([15]). On 2 August 2022 the Home Secretary withdrew the decision in order to consider his evidence. On 11 August 2022 SIAC served a notice that the application was treated as withdrawn under rule 11A ([16]). She remade the refusal on 2 August 2023, and SIAC quashed that decision on 30 September 2024 ([16]).
On 12 June 2023 FGF applied for his costs of the first review. On 23 February 2024 SIAC (Jay J, UTJ O'Callaghan and Mr Golland) held that it had jurisdiction, awarded him costs, and transferred the detailed assessment to the High Court ([17]).
SIAC reasoned that section 2D(4) was "extremely wide" and that the words "make any such order" carried with them the power in section 51 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 ([34]). It distinguished C7 v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 265, where the Court of Appeal had found no power to award costs in appeals as opposed to reviews ([35]). It also held that rule 11A did not bar its jurisdiction ([38]).
The Home Secretary issued judicial review proceedings against SIAC on 14 March 2024. FGF took no part, here or below, for lack of funding ([4], [18]). H7 and H15, whose own SIAC costs applications were stayed, were joined as interested parties by Foster J on 25 July 2024 ([18]). The Divisional Court quashed SIAC's decision and declared ([3]):
> (i) [SIAC] does not have the power to award costs in cases where an applicant has applied for a review, pursuant to sections 2C-2F of the [1997 Act]; and in any event (ii) [SIAC] does not have jurisdiction to award costs where an application for review is withdrawn or treated as withdrawn pursuant to Rule 11A of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Procedure Rules 2003 [rule 11A].
H7 and H15 appealed on three grounds: construction, article 14 and rule 11A ([5]-[8]). The Master of the Rolls gave the main judgment. Singh LJ added a short judgment, and all three judges agreed with both ([67]-[69]).
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This is the ratio of the case. Section 2D(3) requires SIAC to apply "the principles which would be applied in judicial review proceedings". Section 2D(4) provides that if SIAC decides the decision should be set aside, "it may make any such order, or give any such relief, as may be made or given in judicial review proceedings".
The Master of the Rolls held that SIAC erred in reading the second half of section 2D(4) literally and in disregarding its opening words ([47]). The Act must be read as a whole against its legislative history ([48]). Section 2D is headed "Jurisdiction", and each of its subsections concerns the decision to set aside. The width of the words did not settle the point ([52]):
> Whilst I accept that, in many contexts, those words would obviously be wide enough to include an order for costs, context is crucial.
The words refer to the relief available under section 31 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, including remittal or substitution under section 31(5), and not to section 51 ([52]):
> ... are to be taken to be referring to the jurisdictional powers in section 31 (including the relief capable of being granted under section 31(5)), rather than to any more general and wide-ranging procedural or costs powers such as those contained in section 51 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 ...
SIAC had called the opening words of section 2D(4) anomalous. The Master of the Rolls disagreed: they fit the rest of the section ([53]). The Divisional Court had added that SIAC's reading would create an unusual one-way costs power, available only where a decision was set aside, and that nothing suggested Parliament meant to do that ([41]). The Master of the Rolls broadly endorsed the Divisional Court's reasoning at its [61]-[78] ([53]). He also disagreed with the conclusion of the Divisional Court at [38] in R (Ignaoua) v SSHD [2014] EWHC 1382 (Admin) ([53]), which had said that section 2C enabled a successful claimant to claim costs from the Home Secretary, but not the other way round.
Section 5 makes no express mention of costs ([26]). The court still held that the rule-making powers in sections 5(1)(b), 5(1)(c) and 5(4)(b) must be taken to include power to lay down a costs regime by statutory instrument, following Elisabeth Laing LJ at [74]-[83] in C7 ([49]). Section 6A applies section 5 to reviews ([50]). Parliament is taken to have known in 2013 that no costs regime existed ([50]).
> The Lord Chancellor has and has always had the power to make rules about procedure and costs in SIAC in respect of both appeals and reviews.
That passage is at [54]. The Divisional Court's answer to SIAC, recorded at [40], explains the error. SIAC treated the silence of the 2003 Rules as showing that section 5 could not be the source of a costs power. A statutory power and the decision whether to exercise it are different things. The result is stated at [64]:
> ... there is no jurisdiction in SIAC to award costs in review cases at all unless and until the Lord Chancellor introduces such a costs regime by statutory instrument under section 5.
H7 and H15 argued that the 2013 Act moved cases out of the Administrative Court without any intention to change the costs position, and that important rights can be removed only by express words, relying on R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 ([6]). The court rejected this. Parliament must be taken to have understood that the regimes differed: the Administrative Court already had a costs regime, while in SIAC the Lord Chancellor had power to introduce one ([54]). The legislature was also free to change the procedure and costs regime by primary legislation ([54]).
H7 and H15 compared applicants whose cases are certified, and who must go to SIAC, with applicants whose cases are not certified, and who can go to the Administrative Court and may recover costs there ([56]). The Master of the Rolls did not decide whether the status requirement was met, or whether a potential costs claim falls within the ambit of article 1 of the first protocol (A1P1). He assumed both were arguable "for the sake of argument only" ([58]). He then gave three reasons against the appellants ([59]):
1. Section 3 does not help. H7 and H15 never explained how section 2D could be read down when section 5 already allows a costs regime, and they never sought a certificate of incompatibility. "The limiting factor is not the 1997 Act, but the discretion of the Lord Chancellor." ([60])
2. The two groups are not comparable. SIAC is a specialist tribunal. No permission is needed to apply. The applicant does not see the closed material, and special advocates act without charge to the applicant. These differences affect knowledge, representation and funding ([61]).
3. Any difference is justified. The same matters justify different procedural and costs regimes ([62]).
The court accepted one cost of the present position ([61]):
> It is true that a "no costs" regime may affect the ability to secure a conditional fee arrangement, but the abrogation of the possibility of an adverse costs order is a countervailing advantage.
Rule 11A(2) treats a review application as withdrawn once the Home Secretary withdraws her decision. The Divisional Court held that SIAC had erred in law on this point: the notice under rule 11A(3) is not a judicial decision, so there is no determination that a decision should be set aside ([45]).
The Court of Appeal did not rule on that reasoning. With no costs power under section 2D, the ground did not arise ([12], [63]). The "no costs" regime is simply unaffected by rule 11A ([64]). The Master of the Rolls did uphold both declarations, including the one on rule 11A ([66]).
These sections contain similar wording. The court heard no detailed argument on them and assumed that its decision "will most likely apply as much to them as it does to section 2D" ([23]). The conclusions then say that the same applies to their construction ([65]), and the Divisional Court's declaration, which covers sections 2C to 2F, stands.
Singh LJ dealt with two further matters, and the other judges agreed with him ([67]-[68]). Neither changes the outcome.
On standing, he had sympathy with the Divisional Court's doubt that H7 and H15 were interested parties under CPR 54.1(2)(f). They were at most indirectly affected by FGF's costs order, and it might have been better to make them interveners ([70]). They could appeal all the same. The Divisional Court had made a declaration and a costs order against them, and CPR 52.1(3)(d) is wide enough to cover a person adversely affected ([71]-[72]). The Master of the Rolls had referred to their "lack of formal standing" ([4]) but agreed with Singh LJ ([67]), and the judgment does not explain how the two passages fit together. Singh LJ's point is limited to the right to challenge orders made against H7 and H15 themselves.
On the "no costs" regime, Singh LJ pointed out that the costs position the appellants sought would not mirror the Administrative Court. As he put it at [73]:
> ... there would be costs protection for a person in the position of these appellants but the Home Secretary would never be able to recover her costs, even if, for example, another party had acted unreasonably and costs had been thrown away as a result ...
He also said at [74]:
> The risk of an adverse costs order, and the uncertainty of how much will have to be paid if a litigant loses a case, are widely thought to be deterrents to effective access to justice.
He listed the choices open to the Lord Chancellor: no costs, costs only for unreasonable conduct, or a full regime such as CPR Part 44, and whether any regime should be one way only ([75]). A government department can consult on such a choice. A court or tribunal cannot, which is why the Investigatory Powers Tribunal said in McCaffrey v Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland [2025] UKIP Trib 2 at [76] that it is not "institutionally well-equipped" to make it ([75]).
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The construction of sections 2D, 5 and 6A is the ratio: SIAC has no costs power in review cases without section 5 rules.
The rejection of the article 14 ground is also part of the decision, but it rests on the three reasons at [59]-[62]. Status and ambit were assumed, not decided. The judgment is not consistent in how it describes this. It says at [12] that article 14 might be engaged through A1P1 but not article 8, and at [65] that article 14 "is not engaged in this case". The section that deals with the ground gives no reasons on article 8. The safer citation is [59]-[62].
The Court of Appeal left the Divisional Court's reasoning on rule 11A unreviewed. The second declaration survives, but the court gave no reasons of its own on how a costs power would work after a withdrawal.
Whether the Home Secretary could have appealed directly under section 7(1A) of the 1997 Act was argued below and left unresolved ([19]). Singh LJ's comments on standing were not needed to dispose of the appeal, since the Home Secretary took no standing point ([71]). His comments on the merits of a "no costs" regime were not needed either: the appeal failed on construction and on the reasons at [59]-[62].
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1. Find the source of the power first. Before claiming costs in a tribunal or specialist court, identify the provision and the rules that confer the power. Broad wording about "any such order" did not carry costs here, because the section dealt with jurisdiction and another section dealt with procedure. The reasoning turns on the 1997 Act, so test each statute on its own structure.
2. A quashed order leaves nothing to assess. FGF's costs had been transferred to the High Court for detailed assessment ([17]). The quashing of SIAC's decision removed the order that any bill would depend on.
3. Treat stayed SIAC costs applications as having no basis. H7's and H15's applications were stayed pending this case ([18]). The same result will follow for any other pending claim for costs of a review, unless the law changes.
4. Do not rely on SIAC's reasoning in FGF's case, or on Ignaoua at [38]. The Court of Appeal rejected both.
5. Warn clients who join another person's costs dispute. H7 and H15 were not parties to FGF's costs order, yet they ended up subject to a costs order of their own in the Divisional Court ([71]). The judgment gives no figure for it.
1. Advise on funding at the start. A successful applicant in a review recovers no costs from the Home Secretary. Funding that depends on such recovery may be hard to secure, as the court accepted for conditional fee arrangements ([61]). The client should also be told the benefit: no exposure to an adverse costs order.
2. Certification decides the costs regime. Once the Home Secretary certifies, the challenge must go to SIAC, where no costs order is available ([15], [56]).
3. Withdrawal carries no costs consequence for the Home Secretary. SIAC was concerned that she could withdraw part-way through a hearing when she expected to lose ([37]). On this decision that makes no difference to costs, because none are available whether she withdraws or loses ([64]).
4. Send arguments for change to the Lord Chancellor. Rules must be made by statutory instrument and approved in draft by each House ([25]). Singh LJ's list at [75] shows the choices in play.
5. Seek the right status in judicial review. A person only indirectly affected by a decision may be better placed applying to intervene than to be joined as an interested party ([70]).
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The Court of Appeal has decided that SIAC cannot award costs in review cases until the Lord Chancellor acts. The court read section 2D as a provision about jurisdiction and relief, left costs to section 5, and held that the absence of rules means the absence of a power. Article 14 did not change that: the Act already permits the regime the appellants wanted, the two groups are not comparable, and any difference is justified.
The practical effect is a regime in which neither side pays the other's costs, including where the Home Secretary loses or withdraws, and including, on the terms of [64], where a party acts unreasonably. FGF's costs order stays quashed. The judgment records no plan to make rules.
The judgment leaves any change to the Lord Chancellor, who can choose from the options Singh LJ listed. Mackenzie Costs will report any rules made under section 5 on costlawyer.co.uk.
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Citation: R (Secretary of State for the Home Department) v Special Immigration Appeals Commission [2026] EWCA Civ 992
Full judgment available at: National Archives