Detailed Assessment, 2026-07-31
The High Court ordered a company to pay indemnity costs of its failed application to set aside an order and discharge an extended civil restraint order, with the amount to go to summary assessment on paper if not agreed.
William Mackenzie, Costs Lawyer at Mackenzie Costs. More about William Mackenzie.
Last reviewed 5 November 2026.
Date: 31 July 2026
Judge: Mr Justice Dexter Dias
Court: High Court of Justice, King's Bench Division
Citation: [2026] EWHC 2008 (KB)
Nature of Proceedings: Application under CPR 23.8(3) to vary or set aside an order made on paper, and to discharge an extended civil restraint order, in a struck-out claim against receivers, solicitors and a bank
Key Issues:
Case No: KB-2024-001774
Hearing date: 17 June 2026
Representation: Graham Smith (direct access) for the Claimant/Applicant; James McWilliams (instructed by Addleshaw Goddard LLP) for the Defendants/Respondents
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In Perseus Ventures Limited v David Foskett & Ors [2026] EWHC 2008 (KB) the High Court ordered a company to pay the costs of a failed application on the indemnity basis, with the amount to be decided by summary assessment on paper if not agreed. Dexter Dias J held that concessions by counsel at the hearing did not help the applicant, because the respondents still had to prepare to meet the application as drafted. He also rejected the argument that grave allegations against judges are reasonable if the party making them believes them to be true.
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The dispute arose from a bank loan secured on a London property. Perseus Ventures Limited, a British Virgin Islands company owned and directed by Martin Walsh, had credit facilities from Barclays. A demand for £457,349.85 in 2017 was not met, the bank appointed receivers, and the property was sold on 5 September 2024 ([4], [15], [18]). Perseus brought Part 8 proceedings alleging a conspiracy between the receivers and solicitors at Addleshaw Goddard ([17]).
At a case management conference on 5 June 2025 Master Brown struck out the conspiracy allegation and the claim against the solicitors and the bank. He made unless orders on what remained, with conditions that Perseus pay outstanding costs orders and court fees and provide security for costs ([19]). Perseus did not comply, so the claim stood struck out at 4 pm on 24 June 2025 ([20]). It did not appeal and did not seek relief from sanctions ([21]).
It made two further applications instead. The June application sought to have the orders of HHJ Pearce and Master Brown declared void, and asked for summary judgment. The October application sought to vary the order of Bennathan J, a preliminary issue trial and an interim payment ([21], [24]). On 17 December 2025 Soole J dismissed both on paper, certified each as totally without merit and made an extended civil restraint order (ECRO) for two years ([25], [69]).
Perseus applied on 6 January 2026 to set aside that order and discharge the ECRO ([27]). The application proceeded as a rehearing ([10]). Dexter Dias J dismissed it in full. He rejected as "fundamentally misconceived" the argument that Master Brown had no jurisdiction under PD2B because the claim contained allegations of crime ([49]). A civil claim of that kind could not end in a criminal charge, conviction or sentence ([46]), and in reaching that view he took some assistance from R (Belhaj) v DPP (No 1) [2019] AC 593 ([44]). He certified both set-aside applications as totally without merit and left the ECRO in place ([82], [94]).
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Perseus had lost every application, so the respondents were the successful party and the judge found no reason to depart from the general rule that costs follow the event ([83] to [84]). The respondents also asked for the indemnity basis. The judge stated the test at [84], citing Excelsior Commercial & Industrial Holdings Ltd v Salisbury Hammer Aspden & Johnson (Costs) [2002] EWCA Civ 879: it is "whether the conduct of the unsuccessful party is unreasonable to a high degree and/or is out of the norm". He then added this at [85]:
> "It is not the case that just because an application fails that an order for indemnity costs must follow. The court must examine the nature of the unsuccessful party's conduct and assess the merits of the application."
The respondents had not sought a totally without merit certificate on the application to discharge the ECRO, which the judge called a "proportionate and responsible approach" ([85]). He added that "different considerations apply to the applicant's remaining applications" ([85]). The order still covers the costs of the whole application dated 6 January 2026, with no separate treatment of the ECRO part ([94]). It follows that the indemnity basis did not depend on a certificate for every part of the application, although the judge does not say so.
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Perseus made wide concessions through counsel. It accepted that the appeal process should have been followed, that the set-aside application was not properly advanced and that there was no basis for summary judgment ([52]). Counsel said of the application to vary the Bennathan order that "I would not advise him to make that application" ([64]). He also made "no criticism whatsoever of Soole J" ([73]).
The judge did not treat these concessions as mitigation. They showed instead how weak the applications had been. It was "hopeless" to seek summary judgment on a claim that stood struck out, and the same applied to a preliminary issue trial and an interim payment ([86]). Perseus still sought to set aside the certificates while not submitting that they were wrong ([87]). The judge held at [88] that the applications were "unreasonable in a high degree and bound to fail", and then accepted the respondents' answer on the concessions:
> "As the respondents submit, just because the applicant's counsel made significant concessions at the oral hearing, that did not preclude the respondents' from having to prepare to oppose the applications as formulated in the application notice and indeed the applicant's skeleton argument. This is true."
The court therefore judged the conduct by the application as issued and as set out in the skeleton argument, not by what remained of it at the end of the hearing.
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The application notice contained "a series of very serious allegations against the judiciary, members of court staff and legal professionals" ([89]). They rested on a report from Intelligence UK Investigations Limited (IUKIL), of which Mr Walsh is a director ([6]), which described Master Brown as acting with others in a plan to take the sale proceeds ([89]).
Mr Smith said he had seen no evidence to support the allegations. He submitted that it was still "reasonable" to make them if the applicant "believes them to be true", and distinguished what is right from what is reasonable ([90]). The judge, who praised counsel's conduct, rejected the submission:
> "I have no hesitation in concluding that the allegations made against, for example, Master Brown, that he has been acting as an "agent" for alleged embezzlers in the absence of any evidence his counsel has seen save for the unevidenced claims of Martin Walsh and IUKIL, is grossly unreasonable conduct."
The conclusion has two limits. The judge made no findings of fact beyond evaluating the conduct "for costs purposes" ([90]). His conclusion also depended on the lack of evidence. He did not hold that a party's belief can never count.
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The skeleton argument sought more than the orders of Soole J. It asked the court to set aside orders of 2 October 2025, 18 August 2025, 3 June 2025 (the judgment also dates Master Brown's order 5 June) and 15 October 2024, none of which had been appealed and for which time had "expired many months ago". It also sought a declaration that the receivers had breached their duties, and invited the court to "decide the preliminary issue now" ([91]). The hearing was listed only for the application to vary or set aside the orders of Soole J, and the claim stood struck out. The judge treated this as "further support for the degree of unreasonableness" ([91]).
He stated his conclusion at [92]:
> "I examine the conduct of the applicant as a whole in the period after the ECRO was granted and in respect of the applications before me. I conclude its conduct as a whole is out of the norm in Excelsior terms and marked by unreasonableness of a high degree. Costs should be assessed on the indemnity basis."
That period includes the events set out in the ECRO section of the judgment at [77] to [81]: a statutory demand on Barclays, an injunction with a penal notice, and procedural steps taken without the permission the ECRO required. The costs section does not refer back to those paragraphs by number.
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The judge dealt with the amount in one paragraph at [93]:
> "There is no need for a hearing, nor for detailed assessment. I note that none of the adverse costs orders previously made against the applicant has been paid, but the fact that the applicant wilfully ignores the orders of the court is not a reason not to make the correct costs order."
The words "no need for a hearing" concern the amount only. The costs order itself followed a full oral hearing on 17 June 2026. Costs are "to be determined by summary assessment if not agreed" ([94]). The parties have permission to file and serve short submissions, the applicant must notify any objections within 7 days of hand-down, the respondents must respond within 3 days after that, and no hearing is necessary ([95]).
The judgment gives no further reason for choosing summary over detailed assessment. None was needed: the hearing lasted one day, and under PD 44 para 9.2(b) summary assessment is the general rule at the end of a hearing of not more than one day. The judgment does not state the sum claimed, and it does not fix a date for payment.
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The ground for the indemnity basis is at [92]: conduct as a whole, for the reasons at [88] to [91]. The reasons are cumulative. The judge said at [88] that the hopeless applications were "not the end of the applicant's relevant conduct", and he did not say that any one factor would have been enough alone. The rejection of the submission that belief made the allegations reasonable forms part of that reasoning, but it is tied to these facts.
The unpaid orders were not a ground for the indemnity basis. The judge reached that conclusion at [92] and mentioned non-payment only afterwards, when explaining that it did not stop him making the correct order. The remark about the respondents' restraint at [85] is an aside. The choice of summary assessment follows the general rule for a one-day hearing and lays down no principle.
The judge also left a point open. He found it unnecessary to choose between treating earlier certificates as conclusive, as in Crimson Flower Productions Ltd v Glass Slipper Ltd [2020] EWHC 942 (Ch), and giving them significant weight, because Perseus accepted that Soole J could rely on them ([73] to [74]).
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1. Argue conduct from the documents as drafted. The judge looked at the application notice and the skeleton argument, paragraph by paragraph ([88], [91]). A receiving party seeking indemnity costs should take the court to the relief actually sought, whatever is later dropped.
2. Keep the preparation record clear. The answer to late concessions was that the respondents had to prepare anyway ([88]). Time records should show what work was done before the concession was made.
3. File the statement of costs before the hearing. PD 44 para 9.5(4) requires it not less than 24 hours before a hearing of this kind, and failure to do so can affect the costs order (para 9.6). The judgment does not say whether a statement was filed. The timetable at [95] was short, so the figures need to be in order before hand-down.
4. Paying parties should note when time starts. The 7 days ran from hand-down, not from a later step ([95]). Objections need to be prepared at once.
5. Do not present non-payment as a ground for the indemnity basis. [93] does not support that. It supports a narrower point: a record of non-payment is no reason to withhold the correct order.
1. Withdraw weak points early, and in writing. The respondents' preparation was the reason the concessions did not help ([88]). The judgment does not decide what would have followed from an earlier withdrawal, but a concession made at the hearing saves the other side no preparation.
2. Do not make allegations of crime against judges or lawyers without evidence. A client's belief did not make the allegations reasonable here ([90]). Counsel can properly say that he has seen no evidence, as Mr Smith did, while still putting the client's case.
3. Keep the relief within the listing. Seeking new declarations and a preliminary issue at a hearing listed for one purpose counted against Perseus ([91]).
4. After an unless order, use the correct route. Perseus did neither of the things open to it: appeal or apply for relief from sanctions ([21], [60], [72]). Its fresh applications in a struck-out claim failed, and its attempt to overturn that result led to indemnity costs.
5. Think about recovery as well as the order. None of the earlier costs orders against this company had been paid ([93]). The judgment does not mention any application against Mr Walsh personally. A party facing a company in this position should consider early who will meet any order.
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Perseus Ventures v Foskett applies a settled test, and its value lies in the conduct it treats as meeting that test. A company pursued applications its own counsel could not support, sought relief the hearing was not listed to give, and made unsupported allegations of crime against judges. Concessions at the hearing did not reduce the exposure, because the respondents had already prepared to meet the case as drafted.
The order also shows how quickly the court may deal with the amount after a reserved judgment: on paper, on a short timetable, with no detailed assessment. The judge made that order while recording that no earlier order had been paid, and the judgment does not address how it will be enforced.
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Citation: Perseus Ventures Limited v David Foskett & Ors [2026] EWHC 2008 (KB)
Full judgment available at: National Archives