Detailed Assessment, 2026-09-22
Stephen Jourdan KC rewrote his Pigot guidance on issue-based costs orders and gave buyers who won specific performance all their costs despite losing five issues, with interest at 4% over base and £450,000 on account of £1.68 million.
William Mackenzie, Costs Lawyer at Mackenzie Costs. More about William Mackenzie.
Last reviewed 5 November 2026.
Date: 22 September 2026
Judge: Stephen Jourdan KC, sitting as a Judge of the High Court
Court: High Court of Justice, Business and Property Courts, Property Trusts and Probate List (ChD)
Citation: [2026] EWHC 2259 (Ch)
Nature of Proceedings: Consequential hearing after judgment for specific performance of two contracts for long leases of flats in Mayfair
Key Issues:
Claim No: PT-2024-000493
Hearing dates: 20 July 2026 (pre-reading), 21 and 22 July 2026, with written submissions on 5 August 2026
Representation: Joanne Wicks KC and Jonathan Chew (instructed by Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP) for the Claimants; Jonathan Seitler KC and James McCreath (instructed by PCB Byrne LLP) for the Defendant
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In Amaal Ventures Limited & Anor v Eros Limited [2026] EWHC 2259 (Ch), the High Court revised the guidance on issue-based costs orders that the same judge gave in Pigot v Environment Agency [2020] EWHC 1444 (Ch). Stephen Jourdan KC held that buyers who won specific performance, but lost five issues along the way, should recover all their costs to judgment with no discount. He refused the seller's request for a 60% order. He ordered interest on costs at 4% over base from the dates the buyers paid their solicitors, and a payment on account of £450,000 against costs of £1,676,915. The buyers then lost a claim of about £2.569 million at the consequentials stage and were ordered to pay 35% of the seller's costs since the main judgment.
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Amaal Ventures Limited and Shievon Ventures Limited contracted in October 2020 to buy long leases of two flats in Mayfair from Eros Limited. The Claimants are offshore shell companies ([149], [153]) and Mr Aadinatha is their beneficial owner ([87]). On 4 September 2023 the Defendant refused to complete, wrongly contending that valid notices to complete had been served and had expired and that it could terminate the contracts ([136]).
On 17 April 2026 the judge held in the main judgment, [2026] EWHC 870 (Ch), that the Claimants were entitled to specific performance ([1]). He adjourned the consequential matters and told the parties to try to agree the order ([2]). No application for permission to appeal against the main judgment was made ([2]).
The parties did not agree. The main dispute was the Claimants' demand that about £2.569 million be deducted from the prices as compensation for late completion under condition 7.2 of the Standard Conditions of Sale ([3]). That claim appeared nowhere in the claim form or the Particulars of Claim ([20]). The claim form said the Claimants sought something other than money, and the court fee was £626 ([19]). The Claimants applied to amend on 24 June 2026 ([35]). The Claimants refused to complete without the deduction ([91], [184]). The Defendant served further notices to complete and asked the court to discharge the contracts ([61], [71]).
The hearing took three days, the first for pre-reading, and most of it went on the compensation claim ([45]).
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The Defendant's primary case was that the costs order to 17 April 2026 should depend on whether completion took place, because if the Claimants could not complete the litigation would have been a waste of time and money ([104]).
The judge rejected that at [105]. The costs arose because the Defendant said it had validly terminated and that specific performance was not available. It lost both points. He added:
> Even if ultimately the Claimants are unable to raise the money to complete the purchase, overall the Claimants were undoubtedly the successful party and are entitled to an order for the payment of their costs up to the Main Judgment.
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The Defendant's alternative case was that it should pay only 60% of the Claimants' costs, because they had lost some issues ([106]). The Claimants sought all their costs, or a very low discount ([107]).
The judge set out his six-point summary from Pigot at [114]. He noted at [115] that by "issue-based costs order" he meant any order departing from the general rule because the winner lost one or more issues, whatever its form. A percentage order is therefore an issue-based order.
He accepted two comments on the summary made in later cases. In South Tees Development Corporation v PD Teesport Limited [2024] EWHC 842 (Ch), Rajah J said the summary is guidance and not a set of rules, and that the exercise is not purely mechanistic. The court also asks whether the failed issue was simply another argument for the main claim, how reasonable it was to take the point, and the extra costs of doing so. Rajah J added that failing to win every issue "is a less fundamental failure than the failure to make an offer to meet the winner's true entitlement" ([117]). In Vainker v Marbank Construction Ltd [2024] EWHC 1686 (TCC), Jefford J said that point (3) of the summary was slightly overstated: a party "may" lose its costs of a discrete issue, as a matter of discretion, and not "is likely to" ([118]).
Mr Seitler KC argued that Pigot gave too little weight to orders that reflect a winner's failure on issues. He relied on Jacob LJ in SmithKlineBeecham Plc v Apotex Europe Ltd (No.2) [2004] EWCA Civ 1703, who said an issue-by-issue approach "is therefore one that should be applied so far as it reasonably can", and on DSM v Mara [2025] EWHC 1514 (Pat) ([119] to [123]).
The judge disagreed at [125]:
> However, I do not think it is right to say that, as a general principle, an issue by issue approach is one that should be applied so far as it reasonably can.
SmithKlineBeecham was a patent case in which the parties agreed that an issue-based approach should apply and there were distinct issues ([124]). Against it the judge set Fox v Foundation Piling Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 790, where Jackson LJ criticised the tendency to depart from the general rule "too far and too often", and Webb v Liverpool Women's NHS Foundation Trust [2016] 1 WLR 3899, where a claimant who failed on one of two allegations of negligence should still have had all her costs ([125] to [128]).
He reconciled the cases by reading Jacob LJ's words as applying only where there is at least one "suitably circumscribed" issue, a phrase he took from Arnold J in Hospira UK Ltd v Novartis AG [2013] EWHC 886 (Pat). In Webb the failed allegation was just another way of supporting the same claim for damages ([129] to [130]). He adopted Joanna Smith J's words in Getty Images (US) Inc v Stability AI [2025] EWHC 3419 (Ch): "Any significant degree of overlap with other issues would appear to take an issue out of this category" ([129]).
Mr Seitler also argued that where an issue-by-issue approach applies, the winner should pay the loser's costs of that issue with no need to show that the issue was raised unreasonably. He cited Active Media Services Inc v Burmester, Duncker & Joly GMBH & Co KG [2021] EWHC 352 (Comm) ([131] to [132]).
The judge accepted that unreasonable conduct is not essential, but went back to Longmore LJ in Summit Property v Pitmans [2001] EWCA Civ 2020, who spoke of "a suitably exceptional case" ([133]). Taking that with Arnold J in Hospira and Birss J in Unwired Planet International v Huawei Technologies Co [2016] EWHC 410 (Pat), for whom the test is appropriateness and not exceptionality, he concluded at [135] that "there must be something out of the ordinary". At [136], speaking of a case like this one, he said:
> But if all that has happened is that the successful party has lost an issue which it raised or contested reasonably, that is insufficient by itself to justify ordering the successful party to pay the unsuccessful party's costs of the issue. There must be something more.
R (Viridor Waste Management Ltd) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2016] EWHC 2502 (Admin) showed the approach. HMRC won overall but lost a discrete issue that it had started. It lost its costs of that issue, but did not pay the taxpayer's costs of it, because it had not acted unreasonably in raising it ([137]). The judge read Mr Caddick KC's summary in Coloplast A/S v Salts Healthcare Ltd [2021] EWHC 107 (Pat) in the same way ([139] to [140]).
The judge restated the guidance as seven points, "emphasising that these are not rules". Points (1), (6) and (7) carry over from Pigot: losing an issue does not of itself justify an order; the order should reflect the extent to which the costs were increased; and the court must stand back and ask whether the result is right. The other points change in these ways:
1. Point (2) is stronger. An order "is likely to be appropriate" where there is a suitably circumscribed issue, meaning a distinct part of the proceedings whose raising caused additional costs. Pigot said "may be". An issue is likely to qualify where there is no significant overlap with other issues.
2. Point (3) is weaker. If such an issue was raised or contested reasonably, the winner "may be deprived" of its costs of it. Pigot said "is likely to be". The new point records that an issue-by-issue approach is likely to give a fairer answer, and adds the South Tees factors, including the comparison with a failure to make an offer.
3. Point (4) is new as a separate point. If the issue was raised unreasonably, the winner "may also be ordered" to pay the loser's costs of it. Pigot said "is likely also to be ordered". Other circumstances may justify such an order, but "the simple fact that the successful party lost on an issue raised in the course of pursuing or defending the claim which the successful party won will not usually, by itself, be enough to make it appropriate to order them to pay the unsuccessful party's costs of the issue".
4. Point (5) adds two things. A percentage order remains the preferred form if practicable, but it is "a very approximate and rough and ready exercise". The percentage may reflect both the winner's costs of the issue and, where appropriate, the loser's.
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The Defendant had won five issues ([143]): the Certificate of Insurance point; whether the Furniture Package had to be installed; the effect of the inaccurate completion statements; whether forfeiture of the Deposit and Stage Payments was a penalty; and whether, had termination been valid, the court would have ordered repayment under s.49(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 or given relief against forfeiture.
The first four were short points of law that the Claimants acted reasonably in raising and that added little to the costs. They were not suitably circumscribed ([145]).
The fifth took more time at trial, but it did not justify a reduction either, for three reasons ([146]). Much of the evidence on the repayment claim also went to the Defendant's own counterclaim, abandoned shortly before trial ([142]), so the costs would not have been substantially lower without it. The Claimants acted reasonably: any buyer in their position would have made the claim when faced with a wrongful termination. And the decision on repayment had no bearing on the relief the Claimants obtained. It mattered only had they lost on specific performance:
> So one cannot say that the Claimants failed on part of their case ...
The result, at [147]:
> The justice of this case seems to me to require that the Defendant pays the Claimants' costs, with no discount, and I will so order.
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The judge described an order for interest on costs under CPR 44.2(6)(g) as "routinely made", citing Civil Procedure 2026 §36.17.3 ([148]).
The Claimants asked for 4% over base, the rate at which Access Bank was willing to lend to fund the purchase on the security of charges over the flats. The Defendant's only objection was that this was the rate offered to Mr Aadinatha personally ([149]). The judge did not accept that as a reason to reject the rate:
> The rate of interest which offshore shell companies can borrow at is likely to be the same as the rate which their beneficial owner can borrow at.
Interest runs on each tranche of costs from the date the Claimants paid it to their solicitors, at 4% above Bank of England base rate until four months after the date of the order, and at the Judgments Act 1838 rate after that. Any dispute about the amount goes to the costs judge at the detailed assessment ([150]). The same interest order applies to the Defendant's costs under the later order: the judge declined to set a different rate, saying "I do not think that degree of sophistication is required" ([221], [222(k)]).
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The Defendant accepted that CPR 44.2(8) required a payment on account. The only dispute was the amount ([152]). There was no costs budget, because it seems the parties had agreed that the value of the claim meant none was needed. The Claimants had incurred £1,676,915 and sought £950,000. The Defendant proposed £400,000.
The judge said that if a costs budget for the Defendant had been approved, he very much doubted it would exceed something in the order of £400,000 to £450,000 ([153]). Mr Chew, for the Claimants, answered that this was not relevant, because the Claimants' costs had been driven far above what could have been anticipated by the Defendant's repeated failures to give proper disclosure. The judge accepted that this might be right, and that the costs judge would then reject any challenge. But he went on:
> But at this stage, I need to be cautious, especially bearing in mind that the Claimants are shell companies, and minimise the risk that the payment on account may exceed the amount to which the Claimants are entitled.
He ordered £450,000 ([154]), about 27% of the costs incurred and under half the sum sought. The judgment cites no authority on the amount. The reasoning rests on two things: what a budget for the Defendant might have allowed, and the risk of overpaying shell companies. The Claimants' explanation for the size of their costs was left for detailed assessment.
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The Defendant said it was the overall winner of the Consequentials Hearing, applying the test of "substance and reality" from William Roache v News Group Newspapers Limited [1998] EMLR 161, and sought its costs with a payment on account of £175,000 ([203] to [205]). The Claimants accepted that they should pay the Defendant's costs of the compensation issue. They said the rest should be costs in the case, that a percentage order was impossible because the court could not tell how the time was divided, and that no payment on account should be ordered, or at most £50,000 ([210] to [211]).
The judge began at [212] by agreeing with the Claimants that consequential issues "form part of the costs of the litigation as a whole", so the starting point was that the Claimants should have their costs of them. The exception was the costs incurred because they wrongly refused to complete without a deduction of over £2.5 million.
He rejected the argument that the Defendant was the overall winner. Each party had won different issues, and he listed ten at [213]. The Defendant won the two compensation issues, the name in which completion should take place, and the amount of the payment on account. The Claimants won the validity of the post-judgment notices to complete, discharge, assignment or new leases, the costs to the main judgment, and interest on costs. Both had partial success on rent and service charges, the Claimants much more so.
The judge then asked what each issue had caused:
1. The compensation issues involved over £2.5 million and took over half the hearing ([214]).
2. The notices, discharge and the form of completion would never have been in issue without the compensation claim. The Claimants conceded the name point, and the Defendant reasonably adopted its position on the rest. So the judge did not think the Claimants' success on those issues "should be given much weight", although he took it into account ([215]).
3. Costs, the payment on account, interest, and rent and service charges would have needed a hearing anyway, but a half day would have done. The Claimants largely won them and the order had to reflect that ([216]).
4. Conveyancing costs would have arisen anyway, but they were relatively small ([217]).
The judge rejected the submission that no assessment could be made. He could make one, although, in the words of Jacob LJ, it was "necessarily somewhat crude" ([218]). He declined to be guided by the Defendant's costs schedule. The Defendant's summary totalled £319,150, of which counsel's fees were £262,100 and solicitors' costs £57,050. It had first been filed at £280,150 because of an error in the formula used to add up the figures, which the Claimants spotted ([205]). The judge said the counsel's fees other than for the hearing "do seem, as the Claimants say, extremely high", and left that to detailed assessment ([219]). Those fees came to £144,600.
He ordered the Claimants to pay 35% of the Defendant's costs since 17 April 2026, with £75,000 on account ([220]). The judgment contains no order in the Claimants' favour for that period, so on its face they also bear their own costs of it, which their schedule put at £380,914 to 21 July 2026 ([206]). The £450,000 was ordered subject to any adjustment needed to reflect the order on the costs of the Consequentials Hearing ([154]). The judgment lists the two payments separately at [222] and does not say whether they are set off.
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The judge held first that a claim for specific performance does not bring with it a contractual claim for late completion compensation. That is "a distinct claim to financial compensation", which had to appear in the claim form and prayer, with the periods of delay pleaded ([22]). One purpose of a pleading is to tell a defendant what order will be made if it loses, which informs whether and on what terms to settle ([17]).
No authority was cited on an amendment sought after judgment but before the order, and the judge applied the usual principles, adapted ([38]). He agreed that the application was "very, very late" and that a heavy burden lay on the Claimants ([41]). Following Vilca v Xstrata Ltd [2017] EWHC 2096 (QB) and Tatneft v Bogolyubov [2020] EWHC 623 (Comm), he treated an explanation for delay as a factor and not a requirement ([39(f)]).
Of six factors, three had weight. Loss of a claim of about £2.569 million had very substantial weight ([43]). The absence of any explanation had substantial weight ([44]). The third, also of very substantial weight, was that the Defendant had lost the chance to weigh the compensation claim when deciding whether to fight or settle ([51], [56]).
The Claimants said there was no evidence that the Defendant would have made an offer. The judge accepted that ([53]), but the Defendant was not claiming damages, where it would have to prove what it would have done. It was asking the court to take a lost opportunity into account ([54]). He said at [55]:
> I think it is self-evident that a reasonable person in the Defendant's position would have made a very different assessment of the costs and benefits of defending the claim if the compensation claim formed part of the claim.
He found "a real and substantial chance" of an offer reflecting the downside, while accepting that it might have been refused ([55] to [56]). Applying Steyn J's words in Clarke v Guardian News and Media Limited [2025] EWHC 517 (KB) that prejudice from a party's own conduct "will be a less weighty factor", he refused permission ([57] to [58]).
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Once a court has decided to order specific performance and has told the parties to seek to agree the terms, no valid notice to complete can be served, even though no order has yet been made ([69] to [70]). The judge refused to discharge the contracts and fixed completion for 6 October 2026 ([82], [198]). Completion must be by the grant of new leases and not by assignment of the existing underleases ([103]). The Claimants must pay contractual rent from 16 August 2023, and a service charge contribution only from 18 April 2026 ([171], [183] to [184]). He declined to decide whether condition 7.2 is void as a penalty, because the point did not arise ([60]).
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What decided the costs issues. The refusal of any discount rests on the findings at [144] to [147] that none of the five issues was suitably circumscribed, with the Claimants having acted reasonably. The reading of SmithKlineBeecham at [125] and [130], and points (1) and (2) of the summary, were needed for that result. The rulings on interest, the payment on account and the 35% order are exercises of discretion on these facts.
What did not. No issue-based order was made against the Claimants for the period to the main judgment, so the discussion at [131] to [140] of when a winner pays the loser's costs of an issue, and point (4) of the summary, were not needed for the decision. They are considered views and not ratio. On the later period the Claimants accepted that they should pay the Defendant's costs of the compensation issue ([210]), so the 35% order does not test that discussion either.
Weight. This is a first-instance decision. The judge says the summary is guidance and not rules, and his reading of Jacob LJ is his own reading of a Court of Appeal judgment. At [136] and [138] he also ties his view to "a case like this" and allows for a particular aspect of a case justifying a different approach.
The appeal. The judge gave the Claimants permission to appeal on three grounds against the rulings that they could not claim late completion compensation without amendment and that amendment should be refused, finding a reasonable prospect of success on each ([200], [222(l)]). Those two rulings are the main support for the 35% order ([214]), so a successful appeal would remove that support. The judgment records no application for permission to appeal on the costs principles.
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1. Cite [141] alongside Pigot at [6]. The author of the summary has restated it, and some of the changes favour the paying party and some the receiving party. It is a first-instance restatement, so skeletons should set out the new text and show what changed.
2. A list of lost issues does not justify a discount. A paying party seeking a reduction should identify a distinct part of the proceedings, show little overlap with other issues, and show the costs that issue added. Short points of law that added little will not qualify.
3. Ask whether a lost point affected the relief. A point that mattered only if the winner had lost on its main claim is not a failure on part of its case ([146]). Look also at whether the evidence overlapped with an abandoned claim, as it did here.
4. Do not assume the loser's costs of an issue will follow. A party seeking them should identify the "something more" at [136]. That passage is not ratio, and a party seeking such costs can still rely on the test of appropriateness in Unwired Planet. Coloplast is weaker support, because the judge read it as consistent with his view ([140]).
5. Prepare a benchmark for the payment on account. With no budget, the judge used his own estimate of what an approved budget for the paying party might have been. Both sides should offer a reasoned figure, and a receiving party with high costs should explain why they exceeded what could have been expected. Where the receiving party is a shell company, expect caution. The judgment does not consider security or an undertaking from a beneficial owner, but a receiving party seeking a larger sum could offer one.
6. Keep a dated record of every payment to solicitors. Interest ran on each tranche from the date it was paid, and evidence of a real borrowing rate supported the 4% margin.
7. Get the arithmetic right and split the schedule by issue. The Defendant's summary was first filed with a wrong total, and the Claimants complained that it did not show which costs went to which issue ([205], [210]). The judge declined to be guided by it, and his only stated concern was that counsel's fees seemed extremely high ([219]). That remark may be raised on detailed assessment, but it is not a finding on those fees.
1. Plead every money claim that goes with specific performance. State it in the claim form and prayer and plead the facts it needs, for each outcome the trial could reach. The judge said the Claimants' answer on this did not "get close to being an explanation" ([44]).
2. Support a late amendment with reasons. The witness statement here gave none, and that had substantial weight against the application.
3. When resisting a late amendment, argue the lost chance to settle. The Defendant did not have to prove what it would have offered. Point to the change in the balance of risk and reward, and to the decision-maker's experience and access to advice ([51], [55]).
4. Think about what a post-judgment stance will cost. The Claimants won the trial with all their costs, took a point after judgment, and ended up paying 35% of the Defendant's later costs and, on the face of the judgment, bearing their own.
5. Make an offer that meets the likely entitlement. The guidance keeps Rajah J's comparison: a failure to make such an offer is a more fundamental failure than losing an issue.
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Amaal Ventures v Eros restates the six-point Pigot summary as a seven-point version by the same judge. A distinct issue that added costs is more likely to justify an order, the consequence for a winner who acted reasonably is put less strongly, and the bare fact of losing an issue will not usually mean paying the loser's costs of it. On the facts the buyers kept all their costs to judgment, with interest at 4% over base from each payment to their solicitors, and £450,000 on account of nearly £1.7 million.
The later order looked at what each issue had caused and not at who won more issues, and the buyers' wins on issues that arose only from their own claim counted for little. The appeal will decide whether the amendment ruling stands, and with it the main basis for the 35% order. The permission granted does not cover the summary at [141], which stands as the judge's latest statement of the guidance.
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Citation: Amaal Ventures Limited & Anor v Eros Limited [2026] EWHC 2259 (Ch)
Full judgment available at: National Archives