Security for Costs, 2026-10-22
In The Russian Federation v Hulley Enterprises Limited & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 1353, the Court of Appeal ordered the Russian Federation to provide £975,000 as security for the costs of its appeal in the Yukos award enforcement proceedings, by 4pm on 1 March 2027, failing which the appeal will stand struck out.
William Mackenzie, Costs Lawyer at Mackenzie Costs. More about William Mackenzie.
Last reviewed 24 October 2026.
Date: 22 October 2026
Judges: Lord Justice Phillips and Lord Justice Fancourt
Court: Court of Appeal, Civil Division
Citation: [2026] EWCA Civ 1353
Nature of Proceedings: Respondents' application for conditions on an appeal under CPR 52.18 and for security for the costs of the appeal under CPR 25.29
Key Issues:
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In The Russian Federation v Hulley Enterprises Limited & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 1353, the Court of Appeal ordered the Russian Federation to provide £975,000 as security for the costs of its appeal in the Yukos award enforcement proceedings, by 4pm on 1 March 2027, failing which the appeal will stand struck out. The court held that an application for security under CPR 25.29 is not an application for a condition under CPR 52.18(1)(c), so the bar in CPR 52.18(3) does not apply. It found a real risk of non-enforcement in Russia without evidence, and it cut the respondents' claimed costs of about £3,642,000 down to proportionate security, describing counsel's proposed fees as "astonishing".
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The respondents, Hulley Enterprises Limited, Yukos Universal Limited and Veteran Petroleum Limited, began proceedings in the Commercial Court in 2015 to enforce three arbitration awards, seated in the Netherlands, under which the Russian Federation had been found liable to pay about US$50 billion plus interest. After a state immunity challenge failed, Bright J tried further preliminary issues in January 2026 and gave judgment for the respondents on 2 March 2026. He ordered Russia to pay the costs of the trial, with an interim payment of £2.5 million by 1 June 2026, a period of three months that the Court of Appeal described as "far longer than would normally be granted to a paying party in a commercial case".
Bright J granted permission to appeal on one ground. On a renewed application, Males LJ granted permission on two further grounds and granted permission "provisionally" on the remaining grounds, reserving to the respondents the right to apply for conditions. By the time the respondents applied on 15 June 2026, both the interim payment and earlier costs orders (agreed at £877,106.34 including interest to 23 June 2026) were unpaid.
The parties then agreed a payment route through a US law firm associated with Russia's English solicitors, Pinna Goldberg, and the Court Funds Office. The outstanding costs were paid into court on 30 July 2026. The £2.5 million interim payment was paid late, in two instalments on 19 and 27 August 2026. Some further interest was still unpaid at the date of the judgment.
David Peters KC appeared for the respondents, instructed by Stephenson Harwood LLP. Mark Wassouf and Cameron Miles appeared for Russia, instructed by Pinna Goldberg Limited. Fancourt LJ gave the judgment, with which Phillips LJ agreed.
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Under CPR 52.18(2), the court will impose conditions on an appeal only where there is a "compelling reason". Since the principal sums had been paid into court, the court found no compelling reason to impose any condition on the grounds for which Males LJ had granted permission (at [26]). Payment out to the respondents was held up by what appeared to be "a purely administrative matter resting with the court" (at [27]). The unpaid interest was small and did not justify a condition, though the court said it expected Russia to "demonstrate the good faith that its Counsel avowed on its behalf" by paying it by 30 October 2026 (at [28]).
The court made clear that timing had decided the point (at [30]):
> Had the Appellant not paid the outstanding costs and interim costs by the date of the hearing, it is very likely that conditions would have been imposed.
Russia argued that because the respondents had not applied for security to Bright J when he granted permission on ground 1, any later order for security would amount to a condition barred by CPR 52.18(3). It relied on Spar Shipping v Grand China Logistics Holding (Group) Co Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 520 and Spicejet Ltd v De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 1834.
Fancourt LJ rejected the argument as "simply wrong" and dependent "on a misreading of the authorities cited" (at [35]). In Spar Shipping the security application had been agreed save for quantum, and the court's reasoning concerned only the separate application for conditions; the notion that security had been refused was "absurd, and wrong" (at [63]). In Spicejet, security was refused for unrelated reasons, namely that there was no particular difficulty in enforcing a costs order in India (at [65] and [69]).
The court described the practical consequence of Russia's argument (at [60]):
> The idea that a successful party, whether in the county court following an ex tempore judgment or on the electronic handing down of a long judgment in the High Court, had to be ready not just to meet and answer any application for permission to appeal but also to make there and then (supported by evidence) an application for security for costs of an appeal on newly-disclosed grounds, would, I suspect, come as something of a surprise to most practitioners, as it did to the court.
It then stated the principle (at [70]):
> The simple question is whether an application for security for costs under CPR rule 25.29, which will usually (at least in this court) be made in the form of an unless order, is an application for a condition to be imposed under rule 52.18(1)(c). The simple answer is that it is not. The rules are distinct and are intended to operate distinctly.
The court added that Bright J had in any event said that any application for security should be made to the Court of Appeal, so there was no question of "two bites at the cherry" (at [71]).
The respondents had sought both an order for security and an order making payment of that security a condition of the appeal. The court warned against this (at [73]):
> In view of the difficulty of applying rule 52.18 in relation to a condition of payment of security for costs and the broad discretion that the court has under Part 25, including the sanction of striking out in the event of non-payment, it may be advisable for parties in future to avoid a twin-track application of the kind that the Respondents made, seeking an order for security for costs and seeking separately to have payment of the security made a condition of the appeal.
Russia is resident outside the jurisdiction, so the question was whether security was just in all the circumstances under CPR 25.27. Russia said the respondents had not proved a real risk of non-payment and pointed to costs orders it had paid. The court was unpersuaded. The payments had come late, and at a time when Russia was at risk of conditions on its appeal; the evidence was "equally consistent with the Respondents' case that the Appellant pays costs if and when it suits its purposes to do so, but not otherwise" (at [40]). Its suggested distinction between refusing to pay the awards and honouring English costs orders was "little more than a convenient forensic distinction" (at [41]).
On enforcement in Russia, the court noted that a party alleging difficulty of enforcement abroad would ordinarily need evidence showing a "real risk" rather than a "mere possibility", citing Danilina v Chernukhin [2018] EWHC 39 (Comm). Here that evidence was "superfluous", because enforcement would be against the Russian state itself, at the instance of parties to whom it is strongly antipathetic (at [54]). The court concluded (at [55]):
> In short, this is a rare case in which the court can conclude without evidence that, for these Respondents, there is self-evidently a real risk of inability to enforce a costs judgment against the Appellant in Russia, unless payment happens to suit the Appellant's other purposes at any time. This conclusion does not establish any precedent for what is needed to establish a real risk of non-enforcement in other, different cases.
The court also relied on the risk of delay (at [56]):
> This is also a case in which the evidence on which the Appellant relies demonstrates that there could be serious delay in being paid, even if the Appellant were willing to pay, which is likely to entail further expense for the Respondents.
Against that, the burden on Russia was "very slight": there was no issue of ability to pay and no risk of stifling the appeal (at [57]). The court also noted that the agreed payment route depended on Russia's continuing co-operation, which might not survive a failed appeal (at [75]).
The respondents offered three months, with a stay and then strike-out after a further four weeks. Russia asked for six months. The court rejected both, preferring a single deadline of about four and a half months, to 4pm on 1 March 2027, after which the appeal will stand struck out without further order (at [80] and [81]). There is no stay in the meantime, so the respondents may incur costs on the appeal at their own risk. The appeal is not to be listed before 9 June 2027.
The respondents' schedule put their total costs of the four-day appeal at about £3,642,000, most of it counsel's fees. They sought 70% as security. The proposed fees for one leading and one junior counsel included £2,000,000 and £375,000 as brief fees, with refreshers, and £125,000 between them for consequential matters. The court said (at [85]):
> These sums are astonishing and cannot be justified, at least for these purposes. We cannot understand how a brief fee of £2,000,000, on top of all the highly paid work previously done to prepare the skeleton arguments, is appropriate.
Mr Peters had defended the fees only by reference to leading counsel's excellence and seniority and market forces, which had "little relevance to the criteria that the costs judge will apply". The court continued:
> However much the Respondents choose to spend on their lawyers, the Appellant can only be expected to pay what is reasonable and proportionate (there being no basis at this stage for contending that an indemnity basis of assessment will be appropriate).
The court declined to take a percentage of the schedule because it was "too extravagant", and allowed £600,000 for counsel's fees (at [86]). On the solicitors' profit costs (£217,685.38 incurred and £458,623.50 estimated), it identified concerns about the hours claimed for the application, overlap with work for which counsel were also charging, 185 hours to prepare for the hearing and 160 hours for four solicitors to attend a four-day hearing. These gave rise to "obvious questions about unnecessary duplication of work and the number of fee earners involved" (at [88]). It allowed £375,000 for profit costs and other disbursements (at [89]), giving total security of £975,000. The court stressed that its views did not limit the discretion of the costs judge on any later detailed assessment (at [83]).
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1. Security is a preview of assessment. The court applied the standard basis tests of reasonableness and proportionality to the schedule, and the reasoning at [85] to [88] reads like a set of points of dispute. Duplication between solicitors and counsel, the number of attending fee earners and unexplained hours were all criticised. Paying parties should expect to run the same points on detailed assessment.
2. Do not assume a percentage of the schedule. The usual practice of awarding a percentage of the estimated costs gave way where the schedule was extravagant. A receiving party that inflates its estimate risks a court fixing its own figure from first principles instead.
3. Market rates for counsel do not justify recovery. The excellence and seniority of leading counsel, and what the market will bear, were of "little relevance" to what a paying party should pay. This is a useful passage for points of dispute on high counsel's fees in commercial work.
4. Indemnity costs cannot be assumed at the security stage. The court measured security on the standard basis, as there was no basis yet for contending for indemnity costs. Applicants who want security on a higher footing need to show why.
1. Security for the costs of an appeal can be sought after permission is granted. CPR 52.18(3) bars a later application for conditions by a party present when permission was granted, but it does not bar a later application for security under CPR 25.29. Respondents need not make a security application at the hand-down hearing, though they should note that a bar on later conditions does exist.
2. Choose one route. The court advised against applying both for security and for payment of security as a condition of the appeal. A single application under Part 25, framed as an unless order, is cleaner.
3. Pay costs orders before the hearing. Russia avoided conditions on its appeal because it paid the outstanding costs and interim payment shortly before the hearing. The court made clear that conditions would very likely have been imposed otherwise.
4. Evidence of foreign enforcement risk is still normally needed. The finding without evidence was expressly confined to the facts. In ordinary cases, applicants must still prove a real risk of difficulty in enforcing abroad, as in Danilina.
5. Delay counts, not just default. A respondent can rely on the risk of substantial delay and extra expense in enforcement, even where the appellant is able and claims to be willing to pay.
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Russian Federation v Hulley settles a procedural point that Russia's argument had made to look uncertain: an application for security for the costs of an appeal under CPR 25.29 stands apart from an application for conditions under CPR 52.18, and the bar in CPR 52.18(3) does not reach it. The court also confirmed that the risk of delay is a proper ground for security, and that in an exceptional case a real risk of non-enforcement abroad may be found without evidence.
For costs practitioners, the most quotable part of the judgment is the treatment of quantum. Faced with a claimed £3,642,000 for a four-day appeal, including a £2 million brief fee, the court refused to work from the schedule at all and fixed security at £975,000 on its own assessment of what would be reasonable and proportionate. The respondents' eventual bill, if the appeal fails, will face a costs judge who has the benefit of these observations, even though they do not bind the assessment.
The appeal will be listed no earlier than 9 June 2027, and it will be struck out if security is not provided by 1 March 2027. This analysis forms part of Mackenzie Costs' case law coverage for costs lawyers and litigation practitioners at costlawyer.co.uk.
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Citation: The Russian Federation v Hulley Enterprises Limited, Yukos Universal Limited and Veteran Petroleum Limited [2026] EWCA Civ 1353
Full judgment available at: National Archives