Security for Costs, 2026-11-09
In Rosgonki v Formula One [2026] EWHC 2899 (Comm) Andrew Baker J ordered security for costs against a Russian claimant, limited to the issues arising only on its claim and not on the defendant's larger counterclaim. He restated the Crabtree principle and declined to follow two recent decisions on Dumrul undertakings.
William Mackenzie, Costs Lawyer at Mackenzie Costs. More about William Mackenzie.
Last reviewed 11 November 2026.
Date: 9 November 2026
Judge: Mr Justice Andrew Baker
Court: High Court of Justice, Commercial Court
Citation: [2026] EWHC 2899 (Comm)
Nature of Proceedings: Defendant's application for security for costs under CPR 25.26 and 25.27 against a claimant resident in Russia, where the defendant also pursues a much larger counterclaim
Key Issues:
Case No: CL-2026-000077
Hearing date: 6 November 2026
Representation: Frederick Alliott (instructed by Branch Austin McCormick LLP) for the Claimant; Saima Hanif KC and Ravi Jackson (instructed by Freshfields LLP) for the Defendant
---
In Rosgonki ANO v Formula One World Championship Ltd [2026] EWHC 2899 (Comm), Andrew Baker J ordered security for costs against a Russian claimant, but only for the costs of the issues that arose solely on its claim and not on the defendant's counterclaim. The Commercial Court restated the Crabtree principle, held that its main purpose is to stop a defendant obtaining security for the costs of pursuing its own counterclaim, and declined to follow two recent Commercial Court decisions that had treated an undertaking to drop the counterclaim as a cure. The defendant had asked for £1,700,000. The amount is still to be fixed, but the judgment confines it to the sanctions and public policy issues.
---
Rosgonki hosted and promoted the Russian Grand Prix under a race promotion contract with F1, the commercial rights holder. After the invasion of Ukraine the 2022 race was cancelled. F1 served a force majeure notice on 25 February 2022, which it was common ground prima facie entitled Rosgonki to a refund of about US$24 million paid in advance towards the 2022 event fee. Rosgonki sued for that sum.
F1 defended on two fronts. First, it said that UK and US sanctions, public policy and section 44 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 prevented or excused payment. Second, and logically first, it said it had terminated the contract on 2 March 2022, so that no refund was due and Rosgonki instead owed it the full 2022 and 2023 event fees under an acceleration clause. F1 counterclaimed that sum. The figure is confidential, but the judge said twice that it "dwarfs" the claim.
F1 applied for security on 8 May 2026. Rosgonki is resident in Russia, so the gateway in CPR 25.27(b)(i) was met, and the judge found a high risk that an English costs order would not be enforced there. He rejected the second gateway. Rosgonki's audited accounts showed a going concern able to meet a liability of up to about £2 million, and there was "nothing more than a generic doubt" about the future (at [5] to [8]).
---
Rosgonki argued that security should cover future costs only, because the application was not heard until November. The judge disagreed. F1 issued promptly after the first case management conference. The hearing slipped from July to November to suit the availability of Rosgonki's counsel. With trial in June 2027, there was no prejudice in ordering security for past as well as future costs (at [9] to [13]).
He did say that F1 should have flagged the application in its case management information sheet, and that it should not have waited to see whether Rosgonki would serve evidence before seeking a listing.
---
The Crabtree principle, from BJ Crabtree (Insulation) Ltd v GPT Communications Systems Ltd (1990) 59 BLR 43, is that the court may refuse security for the costs of a claim where the same issues arise on a counterclaim. The judge identified two strands in Bingham LJ's reasoning. One was the unattractive prospect of a claim being stayed for want of security while the counterclaim went on and the claimant ran the same points in defence. The other, which the judge called the "primary and principled concern", was that the defendant's costs of defending "may equally, and perhaps preferably, be regarded as costs necessary to prosecute their counterclaim".
In Dumrul v Standard Chartered Bank [2010] EWHC 2625 (Comm), the bank offered to consent to dismissal of its counterclaim if the claim was dismissed for failure to give security, and security was ordered on that basis. Andrew Baker J pointed out that the claimant there had conceded that such an undertaking removed the problem. Of that concession he said, at [38]:
> "In my view, that concession was not correctly made."
The undertaking deals with one-sided litigation after a strike-out. It does nothing about the primary concern. He preferred the obiter reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Anglo Irish Asset Finance plc v Flood [2011] EWCA Civ 799, where a Dumrul undertaking "took matters nowhere", and the decision in Abbottswood Shipping Corporation v Air Pacific Limited [2019] EWHC 1641 (Comm).
---
In Explosive Learning Solutions Ltd v Landmarc Support Services Ltd [2023] EWHC 1263 (Comm) and Cedar Mundi (Holding) SAL v Attieh [2025] EWHC 1930 (Comm), security was ordered despite a full overlap because a Dumrul undertaking was offered. The judge said neither judgment was "satisfactorily reasoned". Both treated the risk of strike-out as the rationale of Crabtree and treated Dumrul as having decided a point that was in fact conceded (at [46] to [51]).
The two cases could be distinguished, because the judge was satisfied that one-sided litigation after a dismissal was not a possibility here. But the judge went further, at [53]:
> "If that were not thought a satisfactory basis for taking a different course than was taken in Explosive Learning Solutions and Cedar Mundi then, for the reasons I have given, I would be prepared to say that they are not satisfactory decisions and should not be followed."
There is now a conflict of first instance authority in the Commercial Court on whether a Dumrul undertaking answers a Crabtree objection.
---
F1 said it had never wanted to litigate and would not have sued first. The judge held that this was irrelevant. Following Abbottswood, the question is not what the defendant would hypothetically have done. It is whether the action "would look very similar if it had been brought by the defendant instead of the claimant" (at [44] to [45]).
He then worked through how the pleadings would have looked with F1 as claimant. Rosgonki had nothing to prove, since its prima facie entitlement was conceded. F1 was "the effective claimant even on Rosgonki's claim" (at [60]). The parties "may as well be" the other way round.
---
This was not a full Crabtree case. F1's sanctions and public policy defences, pleaded at paragraphs 50 to 86 of its defence, were "extensive and may well be expensive to litigate", and formed no part of its counterclaim. They corresponded to Issues 16 to 22 in the agreed list of issues. Applying the principle noted in Dumrul at [8(1)], security was appropriate for the costs of those issues only (at [62] to [68]). A Dumrul undertaking would be "unnecessary, inappropriate, and pointless".
The judge also corrected F1's use of the phrase "independent vitality". That test asks whether the claim adds to the costs of the party seeking security. F1 had applied it to its own counterclaim, which "got things the wrong way round" (at [65]).
---
Rosgonki had undertaken on Form N117 not to resist an order that F1's costs be deducted from the refund if it was found entitled to it. That was not adequate, because it was worthless if F1's contractual defences succeeded and the money was never refundable (at [69] to [70]).
On quantum, F1's schedule totalled about £2,835,000, of which it sought 60%, or £1,700,000. The judge described the exercise as "an extremely rough and ready estimate of the wrong total", because it tried to strip out counterclaim costs and did not isolate the costs of the sanctions issues. The one clear item was the expert evidence phase, about £506,000, which related only to those issues. Rosgonki argued for 40% to 50%. The amount, and whether other items qualify, was left for further argument.
---
1. Build the security schedule by issue, not by party. Where there is a counterclaim, the court will ask which costs belong only to defending the claim. A schedule that takes total costs and deducts a guess for the counterclaim will be criticised as this one was.
2. Tie phases to the list of issues. The expert phase succeeded because the case management order limited expert evidence to the sanctions defences. Where a Precedent H phase maps cleanly onto issues that arise only on the claim, say so and show it.
3. Expect the percentage to be argued on budgeting grounds. The dispute between 60% and 40% to 50% of incurred and estimated costs was put on proportionality, and is to be decided separately from the principle.
4. A set-off style undertaking is only as good as the claim. An undertaking to let costs come out of the sum claimed gives no protection on the defences that defeat the claim altogether.
1. A Dumrul undertaking is no longer a safe route to security. On this judgment it answers only the strike-out problem. Until the Court of Appeal resolves the conflict with Explosive Learning Solutions and Cedar Mundi, expect the point to be contested.
2. A large counterclaim can cost the defendant its security. Where the counterclaim covers the same ground as the defence, the defendant is treated as funding its own claim. Consider this before pleading a counterclaim that adds little to a set-off.
3. Who would have sued first does not matter. The court looks at the shape of the pleadings, not at evidence of reluctance to litigate.
4. Raise security at the first CMC. The Commercial Court Guide encourages it, and the judge said the information sheet should have flagged the application so that a deadline could be set.
---
Rosgonki v Formula One restates the Crabtree principle around its primary concern: a defendant should not obtain security for costs that are, in substance, the costs of pursuing its own counterclaim. An undertaking to abandon the counterclaim if the claim is struck out does not meet that concern, and Andrew Baker J was prepared to say that two recent decisions holding otherwise should not be followed.
The practical result is security by issue. F1 will be secured for the sanctions and public policy issues that arise only on Rosgonki's claim, starting with about £506,000 of expert costs at a percentage still to be fixed, and not for the £1.7 million it sought.
Applicants with counterclaims should prepare their evidence on that footing from the outset. The conflict of authority on Dumrul undertakings is likely to need the Court of Appeal.
---
Citation: Rosgonki ANO v Formula One World Championship Ltd [2026] EWHC 2899 (Comm)
Full judgment available at: National Archives