Magomedov v Rabinovich [2026] EWHC 962 (SCCO): No Jurisdiction in the SCCO to Order Security for Costs of the Detailed Assessment Hearing

Detailed Assessment — 2026-04-24

In the first reported decision of its kind, the Senior Courts Costs Office held that it has no jurisdiction under CPR 25 to order security for the costs of an inter partes detailed assessment hearing, and gave practical guidance on what such an assessment ought reasonably to cost.

Overview

Date: 24 April 2026

Judge: Costs Judge Brown

Court: Senior Courts Costs Office

Nature of Proceedings: Application by receiving parties for security for the costs of the detailed assessment hearing, brought in the SCCO under CPR 25

Key Issues:

Whether the SCCO has jurisdiction to order security for costs of detailed assessment proceedings under CPR 25
Whether a receiving party can be treated as a "defendant" for the purposes of an application for security under CPR 25.26
The proper relationship between CPR 25 and CPR 47
What constitutes a material change of circumstances justifying further security
The practical scope of the SCCO's "self-contained code" for the conduct of detailed assessment

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The Facts

The underlying litigation arose out of two alleged unlawful means conspiracies relating to Russian commercial assets. The Claimants pursued claims worth, on their own estimate, US$5 billion for an indirect interest in a company sold to a Russian state-owned oil pipeline business, and US$8.8 billion for a stake in a Russian transport and logistics group. Mr Justice Bright dismissed the claims in 2024 for lack of jurisdiction, awarding the Eleventh and Twelfth Defendants 75% of their costs on the standard basis and the Fourteenth Defendant its costs on the indemnity basis.

By 11 March 2026, the procedural history included an existing security order made by Bright J in £1,162,000 for D11 and D12 and £211,286 for D14, an interim costs award of £73,116 in respect of a disclosure application heard by Bryan J, and a further interim payment of £32,312 in connection with a freezing injunction. Total interim payments by the time of the hearing stood at around £1.8 million. The receiving parties had served Notice of Commencement and a Bill of Costs at £4.2 million, but no Request for Detailed Assessment had yet been filed and Points of Dispute had not yet been served.

The receiving parties applied for further security of £336,000, said to represent 70% of an estimated £480,000 in costs of the detailed assessment proceedings. Their breakdown was that the Bill of Costs had been prepared at a cost of £220,000 and that a further £259,000 would be incurred preparing replies, settling and attending what was estimated as a three-week assessment hearing. The application was made under CPR 25 and was supported by reference to a number of asserted material changes in circumstance, including the indemnity costs order, the Bryan J orders, a pending CPR 52.30 application, and an increased risk of non-payment given the First Claimant's incarceration and bankruptcy in Russia.

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An Unusual Application

Costs Judge Brown opened with the observation that this was, "to say the least, an unusual application to be made in an inter partes costs assessment in this court (the SCCO)." Neither advocate could find any reported case dealing with such an application, and Costs Judge Brown was not aware of one ever having been made in the SCCO. The point was therefore one of first principles. The Respondents (the original Claimants in the substantive proceedings, the paying parties in the assessment) opposed the application both on jurisdictional grounds and on the merits.

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Jurisdiction: Does CPR 25 Apply in the SCCO?

The starting point for any security application is the well-established principle in CT Bowring v Corsi & Partners [1994] BCC 713 that an order for security cannot be made against a defendant. As Lord Millett put it, the rationale is that "a plaintiff institutes proceedings voluntarily" and takes the risk of an insolvent counterparty, while a defendant has no choice in the matter and "must be allowed to defend himself without being subjected to the embarrassment of having to provide security for the plaintiff's costs." The court must look to "the substantial and not the nominal position of the parties."

Costs Judge Brown applied that principle through the lens of GFN SA v Bancredit Cayman Limited [2010] Bus LR 587 and JSC Karat v Tugushev [2021] EWHC 743 (Comm), confirming that security may be ordered against an applicant whose application, although interlocutory in form, raises issues "independent of the issues in dispute in the parent action," but not where the application "constitutes a mere formulation of the applicant's defence or goes no further than is reasonably necessary to resist a claim."

The application of those principles to the detailed assessment context produced a decisive answer. CPR 47 contains no express importation of CPR 25 and provides only one form of interim relief: the interim costs certificate under CPR 47.16. The judgment treats CPR 47 as a self-contained code:

> "had it been intended that there should be a power to make orders for security in detailed assessment proceedings the rules would have said so expressly and made clear the circumstances in which it could be applied for, and indeed who is be regarded as the defendant and who the claimant for these purposes."

The renaming of parties to "receiving party" and "paying party" was treated as indicative. So too was the absurd consequence that would follow if CPR 25 did apply: both parties could in principle apply, because the receiving party could plausibly characterise itself as defending a claim for reductions while the paying party could plausibly characterise itself as defending a claim for costs.

Costs Judge Brown also drew a clear distinction between two situations. When the substantive court awards security at trial stage, it is well established that the security can include the anticipated costs of the eventual detailed assessment: see MAN Nutzfahrzeuge AG v Freightliner & Ors [2007] EWHC 247 (QB), Excalibur Ventures v Texas Keystone [2013] EWHC 4278 (Comm), Republic of Djibouti v Boreh [2016] EWHC 1035, and Alta Trading UK v Bosworth [2025] EWHC 1097. But that is the substantive court exercising its broad CPR 25 jurisdiction at the right stage. It does not follow that the SCCO inherits the same powers under CPR 25 once the substantive claim has been determined.

The result, in Costs Judge Brown's words: "I am not persuaded that the court dealing with the assessment of costs does have power to order security."

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No Sanction, No Need

Two further points reinforced the jurisdictional conclusion. First, there is no obvious or proportionate sanction available in the SCCO for non-compliance with a security order. Points of Dispute are not statements of case, so Costs Judge Brown saw no proper basis for striking them out. So-called Days Healthcare orders, depriving the paying party of representation or attendance at the hearing, were described as "highly questionable" in their practical benefit. Second, there is no practical need to invent a parallel jurisdiction in the SCCO when the substantive court has the relevant power and can be asked to exercise it at the appropriate stage:

> "There is, for instance, no obvious need for any power to order security in detailed assessment proceedings given the wide powers of the court dealing with the substantive claim."

The interim costs certificate under CPR 47.16 is itself a recognised form of security available in detailed assessment: see Excalibur Ventures at [77]. Its existence reinforces the view that CPR 47 is intended to be self-contained on the question of interim relief once the matter is in the SCCO.

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Solicitors Act Assessments: Distinguished

The Applicants relied at one stage on two Solicitors Act assessments, Bugsby v Stewarts Law [2026] EWHC 275 and Pickering v Thomas v Mansfield [2025] EWHC 3021, in which the parties had proceeded on the assumption that CPR 25 applied to the assessment. Costs Judge Brown distinguished both. Section 70 of the Solicitors Act 1974 is itself arguably a self-contained code, sections 70(2) and 70(3) dealing with the costs of the assessment in particular ways, and the substantive position is in any event that the solicitor is making a claim for the bill, not the client. On first principles a party making a claim cannot obtain security. Because neither party placed weight on the Bugsby or Pickering analysis, Costs Judge Brown did not need to decide the point definitively, but the footnote will be of interest to anyone advising on a Section 70 assessment.

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Discretion: The Application Would Have Been Refused Anyway

Even if CPR 25 had been engaged, Costs Judge Brown would have refused the application as a matter of discretion. None of the asserted material changes of circumstance was found to be sufficient. The award of indemnity costs was not necessarily reflective of any change in the level of security required, "the place for this point was before Bright J not at this stage of the costs proceedings." The Bryan J orders had already been met with a substantial interim payment. The CPR 52.30 application had not been heard and was for the substantive court to address. The increased risk of non-payment was not, on its own, a reason to revisit security set on more general principles: "security is not as I understand it set as a function for risk."

Costs Judge Brown also expressed pointed concerns about the underlying Bill. The receiving parties had not put the Bill itself before the court, only a synopsis, and Costs Judge Brown observed that the decision not to produce it in the hearing bundle "seems to me significant." On the figures provided, £800,000 in counsel fees on what were interlocutory applications, not trials, was a "large sum." More striking still:

> "I note that costs of preparing the Bill are put at £220,000; at, say, £135-40 per hour for a Grade D costs draftsman that would equate to over 40 weeks' work (at 24/25 hours per week)."

That was described as "very concerning" in a case where solicitors should have been maintaining proper ledgers from the outset. The application itself was reported to have generated some £150,000 in costs across both parties, a figure incompatible with the overriding objective in proceedings whose entire purpose is to deliver costs efficiently.

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Practical Guidance on Assessment Costs

The most practically useful section of the judgment for everyday costs practice is paragraphs 61 to 65, where Costs Judge Brown sets out what an inter partes detailed assessment ought reasonably to cost. The key indicators:

Junior costs counsel at £250 to £325 per hour for around one day on hourly rates and counsel's fees, putting that fee at about £7,000 to £9,000
Costs draftsman or costs lawyer dealing with the balance, on the assumption that they will already be familiar with the underlying files from preparing the Bill
A well-ordered file should not take a long time to assess
A typical assessment timeline of around 5 days, possibly more if document production has been poor
Total future costs of a detailed assessment for security purposes "nearer to the relatively low £10,000s"

These are figures that practitioners can usefully cite the next time the conduct of an assessment is in dispute or the level of an interim payment is being argued.

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Key Takeaways

For Solicitors and Costs Lawyers

1. Do not apply for security for the costs of the detailed assessment in the SCCO under CPR 25. Costs Judge Brown's conclusion is unambiguous: the SCCO is not persuaded that it has the power, and even if it did the application is "akin to a lack of jurisdiction" and would be refused in limine.

2. Ask for security at the substantive stage. When the substantive court is considering security for costs, the case law is clear that the anticipated costs of the eventual detailed assessment can be included. MAN Nutzfahrzeuge, Excalibur, Djibouti and Alta Trading all support this. That is where the power lies.

3. Use the interim costs certificate as the SCCO's security tool. CPR 47.16 is the rule the rule-makers intended for this purpose. It already serves as a recognised form of security, as Excalibur makes clear.

4. Consider the figures Costs Judge Brown gives when arguing about reasonable assessment costs. £7,000 to £9,000 for junior costs counsel, "low £10,000s" overall for a well-ordered 5-day assessment. These are useful anchors for receiving and paying parties alike.

5. Bill preparation costs will be scrutinised. £220,000 to prepare a Bill of Costs was characterised as "very concerning" and equated to over 40 weeks of Grade D work. Document and justify Bill preparation time carefully, particularly when it is a significant proportion of the overall claim.

6. Note the doubt cast on the Solicitors Act position. Bugsby and Pickering proceeded on a CPR 25 assumption that Costs Judge Brown was unwilling to accept on first principles. A Section 70 assessment will repay close attention to the underlying substance: who, in reality, is bringing the claim.

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Conclusion

Magomedov v Rabinovich is the first decision of which the SCCO is aware that addresses, directly, whether security for the costs of an inter partes detailed assessment hearing can be sought in the costs court itself. The answer, on jurisdiction and on discretion, is no. CPR 47 is a self-contained code and the rule-makers have provided a single instrument of interim security in this context: the interim costs certificate under CPR 47.16.

The practical implications are straightforward. Receiving parties who anticipate that the costs of detailed assessment will be substantial should bring that into the substantive court's view at the earliest opportunity, when security is first being considered. Once judgment has been given and the matter has moved to the SCCO, that opportunity has gone, save through the interim certificate route. Paying parties faced with a late application for further security in the costs court now have a clear jurisdictional shield, and in this case the receiving parties' inability to produce the Bill itself made the discretionary case against the application even harder to resist.

Beyond the jurisdictional headline, the judgment is worth reading for Costs Judge Brown's pointed observations on Bill preparation costs and on the proper, proportionate cost of a detailed assessment. Those observations are likely to be cited well beyond the unusual procedural setting in which they were made.

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Citation: Ziyavudin Magomedov & Ors v Mikhail Rabinovich & Ors [2026] EWHC 962 (SCCO)

Full judgment available at: The National Archives

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