Mariana v BHP: Pre-Judgment Interest on Costs for CFA-Funded Claimants [2026] EWCA Civ 1319

Funding & CFAs, 2026-10-16

In Município de Mariana v BHP Group (UK) Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 1319, the Court of Appeal held that claimants funded by conditional fee agreements can be awarded pre judgment interest on costs under CPR 44.2(6)(g), even though they have paid nothing towards those costs.

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Last reviewed 24 October 2026.

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Overview

Date: 16 October 2026

Judges: Sir Geoffrey Vos, Master of the Rolls, Lord Justice Zacaroli and Lady Justice Cockerill, sitting with Senior Costs Judge Rowley as assessor

Court: Court of Appeal, Civil Division

Citation: [2026] EWCA Civ 1319

Nature of Proceedings: Appeal against an award of pre-judgment interest on costs under CPR 44.2(6)(g) following the Stage 1 trial in the Fundão Dam group litigation

Key Issues:

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In Município de Mariana v BHP Group (UK) Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 1319, the Court of Appeal held that claimants funded by conditional fee agreements can be awarded pre-judgment interest on costs under CPR 44.2(6)(g), even though they have paid nothing towards those costs. The Master of the Rolls held that the power compensates a receiving party either for being kept out of its money or for being liable to compensate someone else for providing legal services on credit. A contingent liability to pay a success fee that reflects the solicitors' funding costs is enough. The award does not breach the ban on recovering success fees in section 58A(6) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, and Hirachand v Hirachand does not prevent it.

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The Facts

The proceedings arise from the collapse of the Fundão Dam in Brazil in November 2015. There are some 450,000 claimants, including individuals, businesses and municipalities, claiming compensation from BHP. After a Stage 1 trial lasting about five months, O'Farrell J found BHP liable on 26 January 2026. Permission to appeal that decision was refused.

O'Farrell J ordered BHP to pay 90% of the claimants' Stage 1 costs on the standard basis, with £43 million on account. She refused an immediate detailed assessment. She also awarded pre-judgment interest at 1% above base rate on the total recoverable Stage 1 costs from 1 August 2023, the date by which half the fees had been incurred, until 26 January 2026.

The claimants, represented by Pogust Goodhead, had paid nothing. They were assumed to have CFAs under which they would pay base costs and a success fee only if they won. Pogust Goodhead itself was funded by a corporate debt facility of $552.5 million from Gramercy, to which the claimants were not party. O'Farrell J held that, if the claims succeeded, the claimants would be liable for success fees "reflecting the costs of funding the litigation, thereby reducing any damages received", and that this contingent liability justified an award of interest.

BHP appealed on that point only. Nicholas Sloboda KC and Jade Fowler appeared for BHP, instructed by Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer LLP. Roger Mallalieu KC appeared for the claimants, instructed by Pogust Goodhead. The appeal was heard on 6 October 2026.

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Key Holdings

1. BHP's two arguments

BHP said, first, that the award circumvented section 58A(6), as amended by LASPO 2012, which provides that a costs order "may not include provision requiring the payment by one party of all or part of a success fee payable by another party under a conditional fee agreement". It relied on Hirachand, where the Supreme Court held that the prohibition could not be avoided by including a success fee in an Inheritance Act award. Secondly, BHP said that pre-judgment interest could only be awarded where the receiving party was out of pocket or had borrowed money to fund its costs, relying on Jones v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2014] EWCA Civ 363. The claimants accepted that they had to be out of pocket in some sense, but said they were, because they were contingently liable to compensate their solicitors for late payment through the success fee (at [5] to [9]).

The Master of the Rolls dealt first with the scope of the power, since that determined the significance of Hirachand (at [10]).

2. The power under CPR 44.2(6)(g) is a broad discretion to compensate for the time value of money

The court reviewed the authorities on CPR 44.2(6)(g), including McPhilemy v Times Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [2001] EWCA Civ 933, Bim Kemi AB v Blackburn Chemicals Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 889, Nova Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games Ltd (No 2) [2006] EWHC 189 (Ch), Fosse Motor Engineers Ltd v Conde Nast [2008] EWHC 2527 (QB), Fattal v Walbrook Trustees (Jersey) Ltd [2009] EWHC 1674 (Ch) and Jones. It drew from them that such an award is not exceptional and is intended to compensate for the loss of the time value of money. Nothing in the rule limited it to parties who had actually spent or borrowed money (at [36]):

> There is, however, nothing in the wording of CPR Part 44.2(6)(g) or elsewhere to suggest that such interest can only be awarded if the receiving party has actually expended money on costs or has borrowed money to pay such costs.

Such a rule, the court said, would fetter the discretion, contrary to the wording of the rule and to the authorities.

The court endorsed Akenhead J's observation in Fosse that an application for interest on costs should not normally require "a minute examination of the funding mechanism" (at [37]). It then stated the scope of the power (at [38]):

> Accordingly, in my judgment, the power in CPR Part 44.2(6)(g) provides a broad discretion to compensate for the loss of the time value of money, which is for the purpose of compensating the receiving party either for having been kept out of its money or for itself being liable to compensate someone else (whether the solicitors providing the legal services themselves, an insurer or a third-party funder) for the fact that legal services have been provided on credit.

3. A contingent liability to pay a success fee brings a CFA-funded party within the power

BHP accepted that success fees generally include an element of compensation for the solicitors' funding costs, so the court could assume that the success fees here did so, at least in part (at [16]). On that footing, the claimants were "under a liability, albeit through the mechanism of a success fee, to compensate their solicitors for the fact that they have provided the claimants with their services without payment" (at [12]). That was enough to engage the power.

4. Hirachand does not prevent the award

The court held that Hirachand "actually had nothing to say about the scope of the power in CPR Part 44.2(6)(g), nor about its interaction with section 58A(6)" (at [45]). Hirachand decided that success fees are costs, that costs are dealt with under the CPR, and that a substantive Inheritance Act award covering a success fee is a prohibited "costs order". An award of interest on costs is a different thing (at [46]):

> The award of pre-judgment interest in circumstances where a claimant may ultimately pay a success fee is not the same as the award of the success fee itself either by way of a costs order or an order for substantive relief. The award of pre-judgment interest is compensatory, but it does not amount to the award of the success fee itself, nor is it awarded for the purpose of paying that fee.

The Master of the Rolls added that a rule barring interest whenever a party had agreed a success fee would interfere with the discretion and "would be unjust to funded parties in a large number of situations" (at [46]).

5. Two further reasons the power is distinct from recovering a success fee

The court gave two supporting reasons. First, it approved the reasoning of Master Brown in Nosworthy v Royal Bournemouth & Christchurch NHS Foundation Trust [2020] EWHC B19 (Costs), drawing on Hunt v RM Douglas (Roofing) Ltd and Simcoe v Jacuzzi UK Group plc [2012] EWCA Civ 137, that funding costs are not recoverable as an item in a bill, but interest on costs may still mitigate them (at [48] and [49]).

Secondly, the mischief Jackson LJ identified in recoverable success fees, that claimants had no incentive to negotiate them down, did not arise. The success fee is only the trigger for interest; it does not set the amount (at [51]):

> The amount awarded is based on what funding the costs would reasonably have cost the class of persons of which the claimants form part, as opposed to the value of the success fee itself. The claimants remain incentivised to limit the amount of success fees, notwithstanding their ability to recover pre-judgment interest on their costs.

BHP's reliance on former CPR 44.3B(1), which barred recovery of the part of a success fee relating to postponement of payment, did not help it: that provision was subject to the court ordering otherwise and had nothing to do with interest on costs (at [52]).

6. The discretion was properly exercised

BHP made no oral submissions on its alternative ground, that the discretion should not have been exercised in the claimants' favour. The court held that O'Farrell J "was entirely right to exercise the discretion" as she did, including taking 1 August 2023, the midpoint of incurred fees, as the start date (at [53]). The appeal was dismissed.

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Practical Implications

For Costs Lawyers

1. Claim pre-judgment interest for CFA-funded clients. A receiving party no longer needs to show that it paid its solicitors as the case went along. A contingent liability to pay a success fee that reflects funding costs brings it within CPR 44.2(6)(g). Receiving parties in CFA cases should ask for interest on costs when the costs order is made.

2. Evidence of funding can be light. The court proceeded on assumptions about the CFAs, which it was not shown, and endorsed the view that the court should not undertake "a minute examination of the funding mechanism". A short statement that the client is liable for a success fee that includes an element for funding should usually suffice.

3. The rate is not the success fee. Interest is measured by what funding would reasonably have cost the class of litigant, not by the size of the success fee. Paying parties should focus on the rate and the start date, not on the funding model.

4. Use the midpoint approach for the start date. O'Farrell J's choice of the date by which half the fees had been incurred was upheld as pragmatic and proportionate. It is a ready answer to arguments about when interest should run.

5. Hirachand arguments are narrower than they looked. Paying parties have used Hirachand to resist anything that resembles recovery of funding costs. This decision confines it to orders that award the success fee itself, by whatever route.

For Litigation Practitioners

1. Large funded group actions gain significantly. Interest at 1% above base rate for about two and a half years, on Stage 1 costs large enough to justify £43 million on account, is a substantial sum. In group litigation on CFAs, pre-judgment interest on costs should now be part of every consequentials hearing.

2. Defendants should price this into settlement. Defendants facing CFA-funded claimants can no longer assume that the absence of any payment by the claimant defeats a claim for pre-judgment interest on costs.

3. Insurer and funder-backed parties are covered too. The court expressly included liability to compensate "an insurer or a third-party funder" within the power, following Fosse. Defendants funded by insurers can also seek interest on costs.

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Conclusion

Mariana v BHP gives a clear Court of Appeal statement of the scope of CPR 44.2(6)(g): it is a broad discretion to compensate for the time value of money, and it covers a party that is liable to compensate solicitors, an insurer or a funder for providing legal services on credit. A CFA client's contingent liability for a success fee that reflects funding costs is enough, and section 58A(6) and Hirachand do not stand in the way, because an award of interest is not an award of the success fee.

The practical effect is widest in funded group litigation, where costs run into tens of millions of pounds and claimants pay nothing until the end. The court sat with the Senior Costs Judge as assessor, which adds weight to the decision for costs practitioners. Expect receiving parties on CFAs to seek pre-judgment interest as a matter of course, and paying parties to shift their fire to the rate and the start date. This analysis forms part of Mackenzie Costs' case law coverage for costs lawyers and litigation practitioners at costlawyer.co.uk.

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Citation: Município de Mariana and others v BHP Group (UK) Ltd and BHP Group Limited [2026] EWCA Civ 1319

Full judgment available at: National Archives

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