Gomes v AMG: 75% Costs and Standard Basis After Summary Judgment [2026] EWHC 2334 (Comm)
Detailed Assessment — 2026-09-11
In Jacqueline Frances Gomes & Anor v AMG Financial Management Limited & Ors [2026] EWHC 2334 (Comm), the Commercial Court decided the costs of a claim that had been dismissed summarily. Stuart Ritchie KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, awarded the successful defendant 100% of his costs for the period in which he acted for himself and 75% of his costs thereafter, on the standard basis, with a payment on account of £19,400 within 14 days.
Overview
Date: 11 September 2026
Judge: Stuart Ritchie KC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)
Court: High Court, King's Bench Division, Commercial Court
Citation: [2026] EWHC 2334 (Comm)
Nature of Proceedings: Costs judgment on paper following the summary dismissal of the claim
Key Issues:
- Whether a percentage reduction under CPR 44.2 should reflect separate strike-out applications that failed
- Recovery of costs as a litigant in person under CPR 46.5 for the period a solicitor acted for himself
- Whether summary disposal of a weak claim justifies indemnity costs
- The amount of a payment on account under CPR 44.2(8)
- Whether the paying party's want of means justifies a longer period to pay
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The Facts
In Jacqueline Frances Gomes & Anor v AMG Financial Management Limited & Ors [2026] EWHC 2334 (Comm), the Commercial Court decided the costs of a claim that had been dismissed summarily. Stuart Ritchie KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, awarded the successful defendant, Mr Mandelli, 100% of his costs for the period in which he acted for himself and 75% of his costs thereafter, on the standard basis, with a payment on account of £19,400 within 14 days. The judgment is short, but it works through four questions that arise on most costs applications after a successful strike-out or summary judgment application.
Mr Mandelli is a solicitor and one of the defendants. In the main judgment, reported at [2026] EWHC 2284 (Comm), the court dismissed the claim on Mr Mandelli's applications for summary judgment and on the ground that the claim disclosed no reasonable grounds. Two further applications, for strike-out as an abuse of process and for failure to comply, were refused. The claim had been stayed for a long period, its weakness was exposed only when Particulars of Claim were served, and it was disposed of before a defence was served: [28], [30]. The court had found in the main judgment that the claim built around a payment of £3,000 from Mr Gomes to Mr Mandelli on 9 May 2016 was an artificial construct: [17].
Until the claim generated activity against him, which the judge inferred was in late 2025, Mr Mandelli acted in person. Judge Sykes Frixou (JSF) were then instructed and briefed Mr Warwick KC for the applications: [20]. Mr Mandelli's N260 statements of costs came to £34,491 including VAT and covered only the JSF period: [23].
The parties agreed that Mr Mandelli was the overall winner and entitled to a substantial costs order. They disagreed on whether a percentage reduction should reflect the two failed applications, on the basis of assessment, and on the amount and timing of the payment on account: [2] to [3]. The court decided those issues on written submissions without a further hearing.
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The Court's Reasoning
1. The failed applications justified a 25% reduction for the represented period
Mr Mandelli argued that this was a single-issue case, namely whether the claim should survive challenge, and that he had won it. Alternatively, he said the abuse and non-compliance applications had succeeded in essence because the court found breaches but declined the sanction of strike-out. The Claimants relied on CPR 44.2(4)(b) and 44.2(6), on Straker v Tudor Rose (a firm) [2007] EWCA Civ 368, and on Alesayi v Bank Audi SAL [2025] EWHC 919 (KB), where the successful party on appeal recovered only 65% of its costs: [8] to [12].
The judge rejected the single-issue characterisation. Framing the question at that level of generality obscured the different and separate bases of challenge. Had the unsuccessful arguments been alternative lines of attack within one summary judgment application, no reduction would have been appropriate. That was not this case:
> The abuse and failure to comply applications were separate applications with separate factual and legal grounds supporting them which, in preparation and presentation, substantially increased the costs in the JSF period. They were unsuccessful. They were presented as alternative applications to the summary judgment application and were doomed to failure from the start (as regards abuse of process) and optimistic at the least (as regards failure to comply).
That is [26]. The "succeeded in essence" argument also failed. The breaches were not disputed, the Claimants had themselves proposed the correction the court would have adopted for the wrong address on the claim form, and no other sanction had been canvassed for the pre-action protocol breach. The applications had been brought to dispose of the claim summarily, and in that objective they failed: [27].
The result was 100% of the pre-JSF costs and 75% of the JSF period costs, including the costs of all applications. The judge described the 75% as a necessarily broad-brush assessment. It gave primacy to the summary judgment application, resolved doubt in Mr Mandelli's favour on account of the Claimants' failure to comply with the pre-action protocol under CPR 44.2(5)(a), and discounted for the materiality of the separate applications which failed: [29].
2. A solicitor who acts for himself recovers as a litigant in person
For the period before JSF were instructed, the judge accepted the submission that Mr Mandelli, as a solicitor representing himself, could recover costs as a litigant in person under CPR 46.5(1) and the legislation underlying it: [21]. Those costs were not in the N260s. The judge inferred that they were limited, both from the correspondence and because one of Mr Mandelli's central complaints was that for three and a half years nothing much happened: [23]. No percentage reduction was applied to that period.
3. Summary disposal did not justify indemnity costs
Mr Mandelli sought indemnity costs on the footing that the Claimants had pursued a hopeless claim since 2022, had failed to reassess it, had admittedly breached the pre-action protocol and had relied at the hearing on a deed of assignment containing curiosities: [15]. Both parties argued the point by reference to Nicklin J's recent summary of the law in Baroness Lawrence of Clarendon OBE & Others v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2026] EWHC 2207 (KB). The judge treated that decision as valuable for its summary of principle at paragraphs 8, 9 and 25 rather than for its application to very different facts: [13] to [14].
The Claimants drew from Lawrence the propositions that the standard basis is the usual order, that indemnity costs are a departure requiring conduct or circumstances out of the norm, that the hurdle is high, and that the exercise is not mechanistic and must not reason backwards from the fact that a case failed. The judge accepted that summary as accurate and fair: [16]. He warned against hindsight:
> In the context of a test directed to conduct which is unreasonable to a high degree, there is a danger of hindsight colouring submissions as to the unreasonableness of the claim. All claims which are disposed of summarily are susceptible to this characterisation.
That is [30(b)]. He cited Lewison J in EasyAir Limited v Opal Telecom [2009] EWHC 779:
> The fact that a substantial part of a case has failed at the stage of summary judgment does not warrant an award of indemnity costs. The whole point of summary procedures is to stop hopeless cases from going to trial. The giving of summary judgment against a party who has a hopeless case is itself the norm
The judge accepted that summary disposal does not presumptively engage paragraph 9(5) of Lawrence, which says that a claimant who pursues a speculative, weak, opportunistic or thin claim can expect to pay indemnity costs if it fails. He drew a distinction:
> there is a potential difference between a claim commenced under jeopardy of limitation which is summarily disposed of at a very early stage of its development (as here, before a defence was served) and the continued pursuit of a speculative, weak or legally flawed claim through to trial.
That is [30(c)]. The claim's weakness had been exposed on service of the Particulars of Claim; before that, nothing material had happened because the claim was stayed, and limited costs had been incurred: [28(a)].
Two further points were made. First, the judge refused to take account of alleged shortcomings in the deed of assignment because they had not been argued at the hearing. Resolving them now, solely for a costs submission, would create a new satellite dispute, a course Lawrence at paragraph 25(9) counsels against: [28(b)]. Secondly, he looked at the costs position practically. The costs were relatively modest, a substantial proportion had been spent on the applications that failed, and the percentage approach had probably benefited Mr Mandelli compared with an issues-based order:
> I have in mind that, in this case, the percentage reduction approach in costs is likely to have benefited Mr. Mandelli as compared to an (albeit impracticable) issues-based costs approach under which he would recover no costs and would be liable for costs incurred by the Claimants on the failed strike out applications. This is influential, in my mind, against the additional award of indemnity costs.
That is [30(e)(iii)]. Given the modest sums and the absence of any realistic substantial challenge to them, the judge doubted the basis of assessment would make a significant difference to ultimate recovery: [30(e)(iv)]. Costs were ordered on the standard basis.
4. The payment on account was 75% of the reduced figure
Mr Mandelli sought 80% of the N260 total, £27,592, within 14 days. The judge started from £25,868, being 75% of the £34,491 claimed. The Claimants had challenged hourly rates, duplication of solicitors' fees and counsel's fees, including post-hearing fees, in the N260s. The judge's view was clear:
> Without pre-empting the decision of any Costs Judge I do not consider that any of the areas of challenge would be likely, ultimately, to result in any substantial reduction.
That is [36]. Having considered the White Book notes at 44.2.12, Christopher Clarke LJ in Excalibur Ventures LLC v Texas Keystone Inc [2015] EWHC 566 (Comm) and Argus Media Limited v Halim [2020] EWHC 1062 (QB), he awarded 75% of £25,868, rounded down to £19,400: [37]. Four reasons supported that percentage: the modest overall costs, the court's good visibility of the work because it had all been done on the applications before it, the absence of apparent grounds for substantial challenge, and the fact that the N260s did not include the litigant in person costs recoverable for the earlier period.
5. Want of means did not extend the time to pay
Mr Gomes said he did not have the resources to pay a lump sum within 14 days and initially sought a realistic period or instalments, offering evidence of his means. On circulation of the draft judgment he said there was no period or instalment arrangement he could conscientiously put forward, and left the question to the court: [33] to [34]. The judge had regard to Argus on the relevance of want of means to a payment on account and to time to pay. In the absence of detailed evidence of the Claimants' finances, and given Mr Gomes's own position that no timetable would enable compliance, there was no good reason to depart from the default period of 14 days under CPR 44.7:
> As Mr. Warwick submitted, the Claimants have chosen to bring this litigation and will be well aware of the costs consequences of doing so and not succeeding.
That is [38]. The £19,400 was ordered to be paid by 4pm on 25 September 2026.
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Practical Implications
The following are practical conclusions from the decision, rather than additional rules laid down by the court.
For Costs Lawyers
1. Separate applications attract separate scrutiny. The judge distinguished losing grounds within a successful application from distinct applications that failed and added substantial costs. When advising on a suite of applications, identify the costs risk of each separate application.
2. Include the litigant in person period in the statement of costs. Mr Mandelli's N260s covered only the represented period, and the judge had to infer the earlier costs. A solicitor who has acted for himself should claim the CPR 46.5 costs in the schedule so the payment on account can reflect them.
3. A payment on account after a short hearing can be pitched high. The court awarded 75% of the reduced figure because it had seen all the work product. Where the judge has good visibility of the costs, argue for a higher percentage and address the specific challenges in a responsive note, as was done here.
4. The basis of assessment may be worth less than the argument costs. The judge doubted the basis would make a significant difference on modest costs facing no substantial challenge. Weigh the value of an indemnity costs application against the cost of running it.
For Litigation Practitioners
1. Summary judgment against a hopeless claim is the norm, not the exception. EasyAir remains the answer to an application for indemnity costs founded only on the fact that a claim was disposed of summarily. Something more is needed.
2. Early disposal counts in the paying party's favour. The judge distinguished a claim issued to protect limitation and struck out before a defence from a weak claim pursued to trial. The stage at which the claim failed, and the costs incurred by then, bear directly on whether the conduct was out of the norm.
3. Do not raise new merits points for costs purposes. The court refused to consider the deed of assignment criticisms because they had not been argued at the hearing. A costs submission is not the place to open a satellite dispute.
4. A bare plea of impecuniosity will not extend time. Mr Gomes offered evidence but did not produce it and then said no timetable was workable. Without evidence and a concrete proposal, the default 14 days under CPR 44.7 will stand.
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Conclusion
Gomes v AMG is a modest case in money terms but a useful one in method. The judge separated the two periods of the litigation, fixed a percentage for each, declined indemnity costs on a principled application of Lawrence and EasyAir, and set the payment on account by applying a second percentage to the reduced figure. Each step is explained briefly and can be applied by analogy.
The financial result for the paying parties is a payment of £19,400 within 14 days, with the balance of the 75% costs to follow detailed assessment on the standard basis if not agreed. For a receiving party the lesson is that a suite of applications should be assembled with the costs consequences of each in mind; for a paying party it is that summary disposal alone will not carry the day on indemnity costs, but that the default timetable for payment will not move without evidence.
This Mackenzie Costs analysis concentrates on the costs judgment. The main judgment at [2026] EWHC 2284 (Comm) deals with the substantive applications and is the source of the findings on the merits referred to above.
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Citation: Jacqueline Frances Gomes & Anor v AMG Financial Management Limited & Ors [2026] EWHC 2334 (Comm)
Full judgment available at: The National Archives
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