Parsons v Convatec: Paying Party's Means Cap a Costs Budget Under Section 106 [2026] EWCA Civ 1357

Costs Budgeting, 2026-10-26

In Parsons v Convatec Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 1357, the Court of Appeal held that section 106(1) of the Patents Act 1977 applies when the court approves costs budgets in an employee inventor compensation claim.

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William Mackenzie, Costs Lawyer at Mackenzie Costs. More about William Mackenzie.

Last reviewed 6 November 2026.

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Overview

Date: 26 October 2026

Judge: Lord Justice Arnold (Lord Justice Baker and Lady Justice Asplin agreeing)

Court: Court of Appeal, Civil Division

Citation: [2026] EWCA Civ 1357

Nature of Proceedings: Two appeals in an employee inventor compensation claim under the Patents Act 1977: one from the refusal of a strike-out application at a case management conference, and one from a costs management decision

Key Issues:

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In Parsons v Convatec Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 1357, the Court of Appeal held that section 106(1) of the Patents Act 1977 applies when the court approves costs budgets in an employee inventor compensation claim. The financial position of the parties is therefore a relevant circumstance at costs management, not only when costs are finally awarded. Setting aside the decision below, the court limited the employer's approved budget for future costs to £4 million, against roughly £6.5 million approved by the High Court. The court also held that a pure point of statutory interpretation should have been decided on a strike-out application rather than left to trial.

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The Facts

Dr David Parsons, an analytical chemist, worked for Convatec Ltd, a medical products company, from 1991 to 2023. He claims to have devised a number of inventions, protected by seven patent families with priority dates from November 2000 to May 2013. He says that the inventions and patents were of outstanding benefit to Convatec, relying on estimated global sales to 2021 of products embodying them of around $3.2 billion. At its highest the claim is valued at some £366 million. Convatec disputes it in its entirety. The claim began in September 2022 and is listed for a 37-day trial in February 2028.

Because Dr Parsons values his claim at more than £10 million, it would not normally be subject to costs management under CPR 3.12(a). He proposed costs management anyway, and Convatec agreed, principally because he needed ATE insurance to protect against an adverse costs order. His policy has a limit of cover of £800,000. It also funds disbursements by way of loan at 10% interest. About £198,000 had been drawn down by the time of the appeal hearing. His solicitors act under a conditional fee agreement with an undisclosed success fee, which the court assumed was "at or near the maximum uplift of 100%".

Costs management was adjourned from the November 2025 hearing before Mellor J for lack of time. By the revised budgets of 19 December 2025, Dr Parsons had incurred just under £2.7 million and sought approval of a further £5.3 million. Convatec had incurred £4.2 million and sought approval of £10.2 million in future costs.

At the costs management conference on 30 January 2026, Richards J first carried out a conventional budgeting exercise without regard to section 106, approving future costs of approximately £4.7 million for Dr Parsons and £6.5 million for Convatec ([2026] EWHC 300 (Pat)). In a reserved judgment of 16 February 2026 ([2026] EWHC 325 (Pat)), he held that section 106 did not apply to costs budgeting, and that if it did he would reject each of the three limits on Convatec's budget that Dr Parsons proposed.

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Key Holdings on Costs Budgeting

1. The budgeting framework and its limits

Arnold LJ adopted the summary of costs budgeting principles given by Joanna Smith J in Various Shared Appreciation Mortgage Borrowers v BOS (Shared Appreciation Mortgages) No 1 plc [2022] EWHC 2594 (Ch) at [15], and added three points at [57] to [59]. First, it was common ground that the test of what is reasonable and proportionate on approving a budget is the same as on a standard basis assessment. Secondly, he cited Davis LJ in Harrison v University Hospitals NHS Trust [2017] EWCA Civ 792 at [44] on the "significant fetter" created by the need to show good reason to depart from a budget. Thirdly, he accepted Convatec's point that the certainty a budget provides "should not be overstated": a budget can be varied, does not apply on an indemnity basis assessment, and can be departed from for good reason.

2. The single-judge order in Shanks v Unilever was not binding

Convatec relied on an unreported order made on paper by Floyd LJ on 20 July 2015 in Shanks v Unilever plc, which limited each party's recoverable costs of the appeal to £50,000. His reasons included this sentence:

> "I am not persuaded that section 106 of the Patents Act 1977 has any application at this stage, as opposed to when costs are awarded."

Richards J had treated the order as irrelevant because it was not concerned with costs budgeting. The Court of Appeal disagreed with that reasoning at [72]: the question was the meaning of section 106, and Floyd LJ's view, if correct, was a complete answer to Dr Parsons' case. The court therefore had to decide whether the order was binding.

Counsel found no authority on when a decision of a single judge of the Court of Appeal binds later constitutions. Arnold LJ reasoned from principle. By Cave v Robinson Jarvis & Rolf [2001] EWCA Civ 245, decisions on applications for permission to appeal are not binding, because of the summary procedure, brief argument and unlikelihood of appeal. Under section 58 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and CPR 52.24(6), a single judge's decision in proceedings incidental to an appeal can be challenged only by reconsideration and cannot be appealed to the Supreme Court. At [86] he concluded that such a decision "cannot be more authoritative than a decision of two (or three) judges on an application for permission to appeal", particularly where it was a case management decision with briefly expressed reasons and the arguments put to the judge were unknown:

> "Accordingly, the decision is not binding on this Court."

The court also remarked at [70] that Convatec had obtained the order from the Civil Appeals Office under CPR 5.4C(1), and that "It would be extraordinary if an important point of law were to depend on such a happenstance."

3. Determining what costs to award includes the amount of costs

The purpose of section 106(1) was not in dispute. Employee compensation claims often involve an inequality of arms, and Parliament wanted the court to have tools that would reduce the risk that fear of an adverse costs award would deter employees from claiming. It was also common ground that the section applies to interim and final costs orders.

Convatec argued that "determining … what costs … to award" is distinct from assessing the amount of costs, and that the court cannot decide what costs to award before deciding whether to award costs at all. The court rejected both arguments. While costs are conventionally dealt with in two stages, incidence and basis followed by quantum (citing Lahey v Pirelli Tyres Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 91 and O'Beirne v Hudson [2010] EWCA Civ 52), the natural meaning of the words includes the amount. That reading is supported by CPR 44.2(6)(b), which allows an order to pay "a stated amount", and by section 106(2), which permits the court to fix a lump sum or direct assessment on a scale. The fixed costs regime in CPR Part 45 and the IPEC scale costs show that amounts can be set before incidence is decided.

At [95] the court called Convatec's position, under which financial position counts when deciding incidence and basis but not amount, "illogical, contrary to the language of section 106(1) and would not accord with its purpose". It concluded at [96]:

> "I therefore consider that Dr Parsons is correct that "determining … what costs … to award" in section 106 embraces each step on the critical path to a decision as to what costs to award."

4. Approving a costs budget is a step on that path

At [97] the court held that budget approval is such a step:

> "It sets out what costs each party will prima facie recover if wholly successful. As discussed above, it is not wholly determinative of that question, but it is nevertheless an important step on the way."

Convatec advanced four further arguments, each rejected.

The first was that budgeting is concerned only with what costs it is reasonable and proportionate for the receiving party to incur, which does not depend on the paying party's means. The court accepted that CPR 44.4 sets out a closed list of factors that excludes the parties' financial circumstances (Coventry v Lawrence [2015] UKSC 50 at [79] to [81]). Although it heard no detailed argument on the point, it said it "appears to follow" that the court should not take the paying party's means into account when approving budgets in ordinary cases, notwithstanding CPR 1.1(2). But where section 106(1) applies, primary legislation requires it. At [100]:

> "As a matter of logic, reasonableness and proportionality do not have to be viewed solely from the perspective of the receiving party."

The court drew support from the rationale for IPEC scale costs, explained in Salts Healthcare Ltd v Pelican Healthcare Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 93 at [148] and [149]: parties of small means should not be deterred by an open-ended exposure to the other side's costs, which requires that exposure to be predictable in advance.

The second argument was that the relevant circumstances can be known only when costs are finally awarded. The court answered that at the budgeting stage the court considers the circumstances known to it, and that later developments can supply a "good reason" to depart from the budget.

The third was that section 106 would produce pre-emptive costs orders. The court said that taking the parties' means into account on budgeting "does not (at least necessarily) amount to making a pre-emptive costs order".

The fourth was that section 106 could not apply both at budgeting and at the final costs decision. The court saw no reason why it should not apply at every step, but gave this warning at [103]:

> "If it has been applied in a particular way when approving costs budgets, then the court will have to be careful at subsequent stages of the process not in effect to apply the same deduction twice over; but that is a different point."

It added that budgeting does not cover costs incurred before approval, so there remains "plenty of room" for section 106(1) to apply to incurred costs. Ground 1 succeeded: "Section 106(1) does apply when a court is approving costs budgets."

5. The judge's discretion was flawed and the court set its own limit

Richards J had found that Dr Parsons' means were "modest and limited" and that most, if not all, of his remaining ATE cover would be needed for expert fees and other disbursements before trial. He rejected three proposals: limiting Convatec's budget to IPEC scale costs (not pursued on appeal); limiting it to the remaining ATE cover of £664,000; and limiting it to one-third of Dr Parsons' own budget. The third rested on tax: Dr Parsons pays VAT at 20%, so £1,200 for every £1,000 of base costs, while Convatec recovers VAT and deducts the costs against corporation tax at 25%, so pays in effect £750. The judge preferred to leave section 106 to the end of the case, "when all relevant circumstances, including financial position, can be considered".

The Court of Appeal acknowledged that this was the kind of case management decision with which it should not normally interfere, but upheld both of Dr Parsons' criticisms. The judge's alternative reasoning was affected by his view of the law, and he had considered the effect on the claim of leaving Convatec's budget unrestricted only when construing the section, not when exercising his discretion. At [116]:

> "Even then, he failed to take into account Dr Parsons' need for a reasonable degree of certainty at this stage that Convatec will not recover the full extent of its provisionally approved budget if it is successful."

The court agreed that none of the three original proposals was acceptable, but held at [118] that the judge's lack of enthusiasm for them "did not relieve him of the obligation to try to devise an order which was fair to both parties".

On appeal counsel for Dr Parsons put forward a new proposal. The highest section 40 award to date is the £2 million awarded in Shanks v Unilever [2019] UKSC 45. ATE cover of £4 million might cost a premium of around 50% of the sum insured, so a claimant who won the same sum as Professor Shanks would spend it all on the premium. Dr Parsons therefore proposed that Convatec's budgeted costs be limited to £4 million. The court accepted this as roughly two-thirds of the budget approved below, better aligned with the tax difference between the parties, and much closer to Dr Parsons' own approved future costs. At [120]:

> "In my view Convatec ought to be able properly to defend Dr Parsons' claim on a budget of £4 million, particularly now that this Court's decision on section 40(1) has removed one significant source of uncertainty, and hence costs."

The court did not need to decide an alternative proposal of £4 million "unless the court orders otherwise after trial". It observed that, on its reading of section 106(1), the court could take an unexpected development into account at the final costs stage anyway. The appeal was allowed and Convatec's approved budget limited to £4 million.

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The First Appeal: Deciding a Point of Law Before Trial

The first appeal also bears on costs. Dr Parsons applied under CPR 3.4(2)(a) to strike out Convatec's plea that, as a matter of law, the benefit of several inventions or patents cannot be combined to establish outstanding benefit under section 40(1). Mellor J declined to decide the point, treating the application as an unordered preliminary issue and preferring to leave construction to trial ([2026] EWHC 98 (Pat)).

The Court of Appeal held that the judge erred. Applying Frank v Attorney General of Antigua and Barbuda [2022] UKPC 25 and Easyair Ltd v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch), it held that where a pure point of law arises the court should decide it. The issue did not depend on the facts, and deciding it early would avoid wasted cost. At [23]:

> "This is precisely the kind of self-contained issue that the court is encouraged by the ethos of the Civil Procedure Rules to determine in advance of trial in order to narrow the issues at trial, and thus manage the litigation cost-effectively."

No cross-application by Convatec was needed, since both parties would be bound by the answer either way. On the substance, the court held that the benefit of more than one invention or patent may be considered together, and struck out the relevant parts of the Defence. Whether aggregation is appropriate on the facts remains for the trial judge, and the court directed that Dr Parsons should specify which combinations he relies on, and why, well in advance of trial.

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Practical Implications

For Costs Lawyers

1. Means are relevant at costs management where section 106 applies. In employee compensation claims under section 40, and other proceedings within section 106(1A), budget submissions should address the parties' financial position, supported by evidence of means, insurance cover and funding terms.

2. Outside section 106, the closed list in CPR 44.4 still governs. The court indicated, without detailed argument, that the paying party's means are not otherwise relevant when approving budgets. Parsons should not be cited as a general authority for means-based budget reductions.

3. Watch for double counting at the end of the case. If a section 106 reduction is built into the approved budget, the paying party can expect the court to resist a second reduction for the same reason at the final costs stage. Incurred costs, which budgeting does not cover, remain open to a section 106 argument.

4. Frame a limit the court can adopt. The claimant failed below with a cap of about 10% of the approved budget and a one-third ratio, and succeeded on appeal with a cap of about two-thirds, tied to the largest previous award, the likely ATE premium and the tax difference between the parties. A reasoned figure that leaves the opponent able to defend the claim is more likely to succeed.

5. Single-judge paper orders in the Court of Appeal are of limited authority. A decision of a single Lord Justice in proceedings incidental to an appeal is no more authoritative than a decision on permission to appeal, and does not bind later constitutions.

For Litigation Practitioners

1. Costs management can be sought in a high-value claim. The parties agreed to costs management in a claim valued above £10 million so that the claimant could buy ATE cover against a known exposure. A claimant with limited means in a similar position should consider whether a budget will help secure funding.

2. Explain the effect on funding. The decisive error below was the failure to weigh the claimant's need for certainty now about his exposure. Evidence of how the opponent's budget affects ATE premiums or funder returns, and so the net value of any award, is central to the argument.

3. Put pure points of law to the court early. A strike-out application can obtain a binding answer on a pure point of law before trial, and the court should decide it rather than defer it. The responding party does not need a cross-application to be bound by the result.

4. Expect closer case management in section 40 claims. The court described the legislation as "not fit for purpose" and questioned the length of the proceedings and of the trial. It also said that defending the claim on the lower budget will require further case management.

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Conclusion

Parsons v Convatec settles that section 106(1) of the Patents Act 1977 applies to costs budgeting. The court read "what costs … to award" as covering every step towards the amount a party recovers, and treated budget approval as one of those steps. Where an employee with modest means sues a much larger employer, the court must consider that imbalance when fixing the budget, and the claimant is entitled to a reasonable degree of certainty about his exposure before trial rather than only at the end.

The financial effect is large. Convatec's approved future costs fell from about £6.5 million to £4 million, close to Dr Parsons' own approved figure. The court left the final section 106 question open, but warned against applying the same deduction twice. In a postscript, Arnold LJ noted that in nearly 50 years there have been only two successful section 40 claims, and that "One is bound to wonder whether costs have already become a significant obstacle to settlement." This analysis forms part of Mackenzie Costs' case law coverage for costs lawyers and litigation practitioners at costlawyer.co.uk.

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Citation: David Parsons v Convatec Limited [2026] EWCA Civ 1357

Full judgment available at: National Archives

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